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Summary findings
Discussions  of competition  and regulatory  reform  company,  the benefits  of reform included  a IO  percent
typically  focus on price and quantity  effects.  But  improvement  in operating  margin.
improving  certain infrastructure  services  can also  Successful  reform  requires careful  planning  and
stimulate  entry and competitioni  in user industries  execution  and political  support at high  levels.  Regulatory
downstream,  allowing  new firms  to enter, incumbent  reform also  profoundly  changes  the sectoral  institution
users  to offer new products,  and rivalry  to intensify.  formerly  responsible  for the regulation.  Enough
Dutz, Hayri,  and Ibarra present a case  study  of how  resources  should  be provided  to help organizations  in the
innovations  in road freight  services  affect  selected  reformed  industry  make the transition  to the post-reform
downstream  users  of those services  after regulatory  environment  - helping  witlh  such tasks  as defining  the
reform.  After  a period of rigid  regulation  and hieavy  organization's  new role and facilitating  the redeployment
government  interference,  Mexico  in 1989 developed  a  of staff.
new policy  framework  for road transport, with free entry  The national  competition  agency  can help greatly  in
and market-based  price setting.  The result:  faster, more  laying  the groundwork  for reform  by making  a
reliable  trucking  has allowed  user companies  to offer  compelling  case for the reform's expected  benefits.  After
new, previously  unavailable  products  and to reach  new  reform,  the competition  agency  should also  help with
areas  with existing  products.  Cheaper,  more customer-  enforcement,  to ensure  that the cozy,  cartel-like  behavior
responsive  trucking  services  have allowed  logistical  stimulated  by tight entry restrictions  does not persist.  In
innovations  in user firms,  and some user firms  have  Mexico,  three strong  interventions  were requi:red  to
decided  not to keep their own fleets  of trucks but to  discipline  attempted anticompetitive  practices  in the
outsource  trucking  services  on the open market, thereby  trucking  industry  in the years following  reform.
converting  fixed costs  to variable  costs.  For one fertilizer
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Typically, discussions  of the benefits of competition and regulatory reform focus on price and
quantity effects in the market under consideration.  However,  improvements  in certain
infrastructure  services also can stimulate entry and competition in do-wnstream  user industries,
allowing new firms to enter, incumbent  users to offer new products, and rivalry to intensify. To
the extent that refor  m spurs innovations  in infrastructure  services,  and these innovations  in turn
generate substantial new downstream  activities,  the econoniywide  benefits of regulatory
reform are likely to be substantially  greater.
In this case study, we quantify the positive benefits achievable  from innovations in road
freight services on selected  downstream  firms that are intensive users,  of such services,
following regulatory reform. From a particularly extreme  degree of rigid regulatien with a high
degree of government interference, Mexico  put in place beginning in 1989 a new -policy
framework for the road transport industry based on free entry and market-based  price setting.
Besides expectecd  gains from reductions in trucking  prices, there have been a number of
additional sources of downstream  gains. Importantly,  faster and more reliable trucking has
allowed user companies to offer new goods,  both introducing  previously unavailable products
as well as making it possible for existing  products to reach new areas. Cheaper and more
customer-responsive  trucking services  have also led to a number of other logistics-related
innovations  within user f.-irms.  Finally, some user firms, instead of co:ntinuing  to invest and
maintain a private own-account  fleet of trucks, have outsourced  and purchased the services on
the now more efi'icient  open market. Although such costs are not largely sunk, tapping capital
markets may not be an option for prospective entrants lacking reputaltion.  An important
additional benefit of a more competitive  trucking service market, therefore, is to allow firms to
outsource their transport requirements,  in effect converting fixed into variable costs. The total
up-side benefits are sizeable:  the improvement  in operating margin d:irectly  attributable to road
freight innovations for a representative  fertilizer company  is a surprisingly large 10 percent.
An important political economy lesson is that successfiul  reform requires careful planning,
execution and high-level political support. Regulatory  reform also causes profound changes in
the sectoral institution formerly responsible  for the regulation.  Any regulatory reform effort
should assign sufficient resources to assist such organizaticn in making the transition to
postregulatory reformi  conditions, assisting with such tasks as defining the organization's new
role and facilitating  redeployment of staff. Finally, the national competition agency can play a
critical role in helping lay the groundwork  for reform, by nmaking  as compelling a case as
possible for the expected benefits of reform. In addition,  the competition agency rnust play a
careful post-reform enforcement  role to ensure that cozy cartel-like  behavior stimulated by
tight entry restrictions does not persist. At least three separate strong interventions  were
required to discipline attempted anticompetitive  practices by the trucking industry in the years
following the initial regulatory reforms.1. Introduction
The transport of freighit  is an input to the production  of capital, intermediate,  and consumer
goods and services. As can be verified by input-output  tables, it is almost impossible to think
of a line of business that does not use transport.  As such, any inefficiencies  in transportation
services as well as any monopolistic  structures  in its markets constitule an additional cost and
at times a bottleneck for all other sectors of the economy.  WVhen  adding unnecessary  costs,
inefficient transport services are equivalent  to additional  import or export tariffs. When
constituting a bottleneck due to lack of capacity  to move more freight in a more tirmely  manner,
they become equivalent to quantitative  restrictions. Importa:ntly,  in addition to being seen as a
means to reduce costs, more efficient transport and logistics systems are increasingly  regarded
as a means of boosting revenues and a source of competitive advantagre.  With the increasing
emphasis of businesses on revenue-enhancement  opportunities from logistics management and
outsourcing, inefficiencies  in freight transport  can cripple a country's efforts to enhance its
overall competitiveness. IBox 1]
In the Mexican transport sector,  road freight transport  oni  federal highways prior to 1989
was subject to a rigid regulation  with a high degree of interference  by government. Important
government-imposed  barriers to competition  included entry restrictions to operate on federal
highways, discretionary  allocations of freight among truckers, and strong restrictions on
moving cargo outside the established transport  corridors. Of'ficial  tarii'fs applied to all cargo
and a semipublic company  held a monopoly  in handling containers. Regulations did not allow
companies to cha:rge  higher rates for better service and hence no incentive to offer better
services. Neither did they allow them to compete with one another by offering lower rates. As
a result, the trucking indu,stry  was characterised  by a limitec.  number of firms operating with
minimal competilion. Moreover, to maintain this highly ineifficient  and archaic system, the
government employed a sizeable  bureaucracy.
In 1989, the govern-ment  formulated  a new policy framework  to deregulate the road
transport industry. The government's vision was to create a competitive  trucking industry with
free exit and entry and market-based  pricing, without intrusive government regulation. The
government focused its deregulation efforts in transportation  and telecommunications  with the
belief that they accounted for major supply bottlenecks and market im.perfections.  Their reform
was deemed essential to achieve  more rapid and sustainable growth.
This study assesses the impact of regulatory reform in the Mexican road freight industry by
focusing on selected dlownstream  users. Following an overview  of the political economy of
regulatory reform, the evolution of regulatory structures  is examined  to provide a context for
the subsequent inmpact-  assessment. The market impact of regulatory reform is assessed first by
examining the evolution of market structure  and conduct, and then by quantifying changes in
performance.  The:  major theme in the assessment  of perfonrmance  is the positive impact of
removing bottlenecks for competition. In particular, we emphasise the large magnitude of
downstream  benefits possible from innovation and new products that accompany  rmore  intense
rivalry in the provision of this essential upstream  business s  -rvice. The study concludes  by
highlighting  remaining areas where further regulatory refonn may yield additional
economywide  benefits.
1Box 1: Supply Chain Logistics - Moving Up the Corporate and Policy Agenda
Transportation  and the somewhat  broader  concept of logistics (including warehousing,  inventory and
administration  in addition  to physical transport)  have long been seen as minor cost items. Businesses  did not
believe that they could build competitive advantage  based on logistics and hence ignored it. Similarly economic
analysis recognised only the direct  benefits of lower  transportation  costs. That was before the supply chain
revolution in the industrialised  world (supply chain management  refers to the integration of the flow of gooc[s,
information and finance to move products from suppliers to manufacturers  to retailers as efficiently and
inexpensively  as possible). First came the innovation  ofjust-in-time inventory systems in 1980s. The idea was
simple: the bigger a firm's inventories  the larger its operating capital  requirements. With more cost-focused
management,  such as ordering inputs just when needed, companies  leamed to slim down inventories. Importantly,
they also realised that the infrastructure  for  just-in-time input  deliveries could be useful for quickly changingy
designs and customising  products. More cost-focused  inventory management  and flexible  production technologies
went hand in hand, leading companies  to realise that supply  chain management  is not simply a means to redulce
costs but a means to gain competitive  advantage  over rivals. Companies  introducing  overnight deliveries to their
retailers and next-day service for their customers  began to win substantial  market shares from established
competitors.  The dynamic aspects of supply chain management  for a manufacturer  require feedback from retailers
on daily sales mix and volume. The manufacturer  responds to the feedback  by changing design, sourcing and
production volumes. Flexible  manufacturing  became  the darling of business academics  towards the end of 1  980s.'
A key component  of this process was the development  of an efficient communications  interface with
suppliers,  cutting back on transaction costs.  On-line computer  systems  allowed companies  to communicate  with
their suppliers as easily as they do intemally. Efficient communications,  however, lead to maximum  gains only if
goods flow as quickly as information.  Logistics  and communications  are highly complementary  factors especially
for businesses that manufacture  or distribute and market consumer  goods. Top European industrial and service
sector companies  have reduced logistics costs to 7.5  percent of revenues  in 1998 from 14.3  percent in 1987,  and
cycle times to 12 days from 27.2
As companies  have leamed to establish flexible  links to their suppliers and customers,  they grew more
confident about aggressive outsourcing.  It is now a mantra of management  that except for a few core functi  cins
everything  else should  be outsourced.3  Remarkably,  about 70 percent of all U.S. Fortune 500 companies  outsource
some or all of their logistics activities. 4
Outsourcing  has an important feedback effect  on logistics.  Without outsourcing  producers must either
establish  their own in-house distribution  networks (costly  to set up and difficult to manage) or rely on distributors
or end-users to accept delivery at factories.  Using third-party  distributors  or public warehousing  and transportation
facilities, even a small  producer can have access to an extensive  distribution  network and pay only for usage. This
brings down entry barriers created  by large capital  requirements,  especially  significant for countries with poorly
performing capital  markets and for prospective entrants  lacking reputation. Despite  improvements  in financial
markets, capital requirements  remain as the only entry barrier  that has a robust,  positive correlation with
supernormal  profits. Therefore,  the conversion  of fixed costs into variable costs should spur competition  in many
industries.
In the new world of flexible  manufacturing  and outsourcing,  linkages are becoming more important.
Information and goods now flow faster and more accurately.  As companies  can exploit market opportunities
without significant fixed costs, they compete  more  vigorously. Only companies  that are able to communicate  and
interact efficiently and effectively  with others stand a chance of expanding  their business. They too have tCl  share
these benefits with consumers  in the form of better service and lower  prices. The backbone of this system is third-
party providers of efficient logistics and communication  services.  Using their services,  any firm, no matter how
small and where located, can reach world markets.
In order to facilitate  the benefits of the logistics revolution  in their countries,  policy makers should understand
how third-party suppliers of logistics services emerge. This study is a first step in that direction. By taking a deeper
look into the logistics operations  of downstream  user companies  in Mexico  that could have taken advantage  of the
recent deregulation of the road freight  industry, we identify  potential benefits as well as opportunities  for
improvement.
i See Sable and Piori (1990) on the emergence and relevance of flexible manufacturing.
2  See AT Keamey (1998).
3  See Porter (1997).
4Based  on an October 1998 survey for the US Council of Logistics Management, as reported by E. Alden,
'Complexity prompts calls for third party', in Financial Times, Supply Chain Logistics, FT Survey, 1998.
2A novel part of this study is that it benefits from an in-depth survey of 30 firms, 15
trucking companies and 15 intensive users of trucking services in Mexico's heartland
undertaken in midl-i998.5  The survey of shippers focused or, three types of industries
representing different cormmon  users in Mexico: agroindustrial,  electronics  and auto-parts
firms, as well as general import distributors.  The most detailed survey instrument combines
technical data and subjective  assessments  of respondents  in a consistent framework,  thereby
generating a set of numbers measuring  the value to individual  downstream  firms of key
upstream innovations  associated with regulatory reform. 6
2. Regulatory Structures and Their Reform
2.1 The  political  economy of regulatory reform
Rationales for regulation.  Government  regulation  of the trucking industry in Mexico
extends  back to thie  late 1940s.  However, lack of enforcement of existing regulation since its
origin until 1977 was the main characteristic  of this period. Most of the trucking companies did
not have legal registration and most of the trucks did not have official authorization to
circulate. In 1974.  more than 7000 trucks did not have the corresponding  permit or concession,
while only 338 out of 1500 existing companies were legally registered. 7 In 1977, a gradual
process of increasing reguLlation  started with SCT's (the Mexican Ministry of Communication
and Transport) Programn  of Development  for Federal  Trucking (Progreama  de Desarrollo del
Autotrans,porte  Federal, i977-1982).
The Pirogram  [Fostered  the revision of the consitutive  deeds (escrituras constitutivas)  of
trucking companies. It also created three different committees:  (1) state committees
responsible for coordinating actions  between SCT and the state authorities,  including the
construction of freight centers; (2) route committees  to emit opinions for the grant of new
concessions on specific corridors;  and (3) technical committes  to review 'broader' aspects-
such as economic.  industrial, or legal-to  be consider for future reformis.  Both the r oute and
technical committees opened the door for an increasing involvement  of trucking leaders in the
design of governmental  policy.
The regulation of roacl  freight transport has been normally justified on grounds of safety,
reliability of service and stability of rates. In the case of Mexico,  the intcreasing  regulation was
justified on the need to provide a more reliable service and to protect transport infrastructure.
5 Of the carriers, 8 have their headquarters in Mexico City and the othLer  7 in Guadalajara, Jalisco.  Of the
shippers, 4 :have  their headquarters in Mexico City and 11 in Guadalajara. Of the 15 carriers, 6 are small
companies with fleets of less than 30 trucks and 8 are larger companies with fleets ranging from 50 to over
400 trucks.  The final transpo:rt  firm interviewed, a multi-modal freight broker, owns no trucks and is
representative of a new segment that operates as a link between Mexican trucking firms and international
shipping companies.
6  Our approach does not rely on measuring actual operational results of individual companies like the studies
measuring the impact of privatization.  Instead, we go through each major operating parameter of the
company and construct counterfactuals. Thus we reconstruct each data point rather than simply measuring it.
This allows us to achLieve  greater reliability with fewer data points.  See Appendix 2 for an illustrative
example of the most detailed survey instrument.
7 As cited in Islas (1990), p. 117.
3The apparent rationale was that open competition  might: (1) disrupt economic activity through
probable high price variability and uncertain service availability especially to less accessible
regions of the country, and (2) lead to cost cutting practices that might result in increases in
accidents and pollution (due to usage of older trucks, less maintenance, etc.).' However, the
changes could also be interpreted as a set of measures that protect the interest of a handful of
trucking families, and allowed the latter to implement  more strict controls in the market.
Before trucking deregulation, about 15 families controlled  the whole industry, although it
contained several thousand individual  truckers. 9 Some of the most prominent truckers did not
own a truck, but their power came from the control and ownership of freight terminals. As,  it
happened in 1989, the decision to open the sector to competition unavoidably disrupted some
of the most profitable operations.
A broad market-based  reform context. Trucking deregulation  was undertaken within the
context of general reform rather than as an isolated action. From 1983 onwards, Mexico began
a process of macroeconomic  and structural reforms following the debt crisis and the collapse
of oil prices. One of the many facets of reforms was to increase the reliance on market forces.
International trade was liberalised through elimination of quantitative restrictions and
reductions in tariffs as part of Mexico's commitments  due to its new GATT membership in
1986.
Trade liberalization directly  impacted the trucking industry. The collusion of truckers in
Mexico was maintained through enforced territorial and cargo distribution of the market.
Market distribution responded to transportation  flows generated  under the import substitution
strategies followed for over 35 years. Trade liberalization  brought changes to both trade flows
and the structure of cargo movements. Exports increased three-fold over 5 years. Cargo
increased substantially  in the routes connected  with international  trade (Mexico City-
Monterrey-Laredo,  Mexico City-Veracruz,  and Manzanillo-Guadalajara)  but decreased
relatively in domestic routes (Mexico  City-Guadalajara  and Guadalajara-Monterrey).' 0 These
changes altered the interest of the members of the trucking chamber and truckers in general.
Truckers previously locked into unprofitable  routes, individual  truckers exploited by freight
terminals and all downstream users could be expected to be strong supporters of trucking;
deregulation. The realignment of interest within the industry played in favour of the Salinas
administration's goal of increasing competition and enhancing market contestability through
deregulation.
Institutional forces for change in trucking. During the period 1988-89,  major structural
reforms were introduced by the Salinas administration  including efforts to expand that miaLrket
economy and strengthen the forces of competition. Within this context, the Ministry of Finance
(Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito  Publico, or SHCP) and the Office of Economic
Deregulation  within the Ministry of Industry and Trade (Secretaria de Comercio  y Fomento
Industrial, or SECOFI) argued for the deregulation of trucking. The deregulation of trucking in
' World Bank (1993), p. 8.
9 See Fernandez (1993), p.  105.
°0  Idem.
4the United States in the early 1  980s must have been an impor-tant  facto:r  because researches
generally attached relatively high welfare gains to deregulation. One study, for exarmple,
estimated that the gains from deregulation  as high as one third of total income  generated from
trucking." Since the M:exican  regulation  was even more heavy-handed, the authorities  had
every reason to expect even bigger welfare gains from deregulation.  A1987 report by the
Ministry of Commnunications  and Transport (Secretaria  de C9municacjones  y Transporte,
SCT) estimated the welfare costs of trucking regulation at 0.'i percent of GNP. 1 2
As part of the larger program of structural reforns to strengthen competition, S]-JCP  and
SECOFI took the initiative for the deregulation  of trucking. The reformrers  had to deal with the
possibility that the National Trucking Association  could have immobili  sed the country in their
opposition.  Although deregulation  was expected  to benefit a large number of previously
disadvantaged  truckers,  the real power of the trucking leaders had yet to be tested. This threat
coupled with the absence of visible strong support from potenitial  winners effectively led the
reforming bureaucrats to adopt the following  gradualist three-stage strategy. This process is
yet to work itself out completely, since intra-state  trucking still remains heavily regulated and
technical regulations were largely ignored at the time.
A three-stage approach. In order to avoid interest-group  pressures, the draft proposal was
prepared by a small group, without open consultations  with SCT or other parties. Alter the
draft documents  were prepared, the first stage of implementation  was to solicit support from
the affected industry associations,  emphasising  modernizatioin  rather than deregulation  without
ever openly mentioning strengthening  of competition as an explicit objective. In accordance
with the recently issued National Development  Policy for 19139-94,  which outlined lhe general
policy framework, the government  negotiated an agreement  with the national trucking
association (Camara Nacional de Autotransporte  de Carga,  CANACAR)  under the terms of
which CANACAR.  agreed to cooperate  with the government in the deregulation  and.
modernization of the industry. The agreement  was signed on July 6, 1989.  The agreement
stressed the advantages of restructuring and modernising  the industry. As a gesture t'o
CANACAR,  the goveniment offered loans at preferential rates to truckers who wanted to
renovate their fleets.' 3
The second stage, was the approval  by decree on July 7, L989  of new regulations
eliminating  most e:ntry  restrictions. Through this decree, the government effectively abandoned
the public service notion that was behind the concept that trucking operations  require a
concession.  The July regulations also allowed 'official' tariffs to be regarded as maxcimum
rates. The third stage (deregulation  part two) was the issuance of a decree in January 1990
abandoning tariff ceilings thus allowing rates to be freely negotiated between truckers and
"' See Moore (1975).
12 As cited in World Bank (1990), p. 1  1.
13 The authorities  were reportedly  aware  that  deregulation  would  lead to a substantial  increase  in supply,
given the excess  capacity  created  by the former  regulation  (private  fleets  were prevented  from providing
service  to the broader  public,  route restrictions  created  a large  number  of empty  return hauls,  ancl  freight
center  controls  led to excessively  long  waiting  times). Stimulating  further  supply  through  soft  klans at that
time  can therefore  nol be explained  by economic  motives.
5customers. The principal reason for issuing two decrees separated  by six months was SCT' s
concern that if all deregulation actions were taken at once, the forces of competition may
initially be too weak to prevent sharp price rises.
Initial reform by decree. Regulation  was implemented  by Presidential decree. It was not
until late 1993 that the new law was published. The new regulation was only published in late
1994. This delay in publication of laws generated substantial  uncertainty among carrier
companies as many were not clearly informed of the new rules of the game, or expected an
eventual  reversal. Apparently,  the signing of NAFTA accelerated  the effective implementation
of these regulatory reforms. The motivation for this phased approach, however, was strategic.
It was expected  by the reformers that a constitutional  reform would take substantial time and
meet stiff resistance within Congress.  Although the PRI had a majority in Congress,  transport
association leaders had close connections  with representatives  in Congress  who could have
stalled the reform. It was therefore deemed more expedient  to initiate reforms through decree
(under executive authority) while carefully choosing the wording of texts in order not to
contravene existing constitutional pronouncements.  As an illustrative example, the prevailing
law in 1989 stipulated  that the provision of public road freight services requires a concession
that must specify the specific route(s) that can be served by the concession holder. The
modification introduced by the July 1989 decree eliminated  all route restrictions by merely
changing the definition of 'route' to 'any route covering the entire national territory'. The
period between 1989 and 1993 was seen by the government as a test period during which they
could have back-tracked  had they faced excessive  resistance. In spite of the uncertainty created
by ambiguous  rules of the game, the approach taken was a pragmatic approach that mininmsised
the risk of a reversal.
Concessions,  permits and the public service provision. To improve transparency and
ensure the permanence of the reforms, a radical step was the reform of the law that took pl;ace
in 1993. Prior to that date, public road transport services (freight and passenger) had by law the
character of a 'public service', which required any nonstate provider to hold a 'concession:'
granted by the federal government. Through the concession system, the federal state had full
discretion to give and take away authorization to operate vehicles. By basing entry into road
transport services  on the simple obtaining of a permit, the 1993  law effectively abandoned the
public service character of road transport.  Through the permit system, the federal state no
longer has any discretion regarding authorization  but rather must grant it obligatorily as lo]ng  as
the applicant meets the established requirements.  Of greater potential economywide efficiency
consequence,  the change to nonconcessioned  service has automatically transferred, through a
constitutional  mechanism, the main regulatory  powers from the federal government to the
respective local governments (states and municipalities)  depending on the road the trucker is
using.' 4 This change has opened the potential for substantial differences in the extent of federal
and state-level liberalization, with attendant costs to business arising from lack of
harmonization.
14 For a more detailed  analysis  of these  issues,  see Sempe  (1997)  pp. 79-83.
6Changes in SCT's role. The elimination  of entry control and rate regulations greatly
reduced the responsibilities  and activities of SCT, particularly within the General Directorate
of Land Transport and Tariffs. The remaining  functions of SC'T  with respect to road transport
include supervision of road maintenance,  monitoring transport  and formulating  transport
policy. SCT also assumed some new functions,  such as super,ision of highway safely.
However, there was a long delay in reducing the number of personnel. Only by May 1994, did
SCT significantly  reduce the number  personnel in departments  previously involved in entry
control and rate reg;ulations.  SCT assigned the remaining  personnel in these departments to
others. Reportedly, as the beneficial effects of the new policy have become evident and
following the departure of certain SCT staff previously  involved in regulatory matters, the
commitment  of scr  to the new policy has become very strong.' 5
Deregulation ait  the federal level, affecting only interstate trucking. Under the federalist
system and the 1993 law, states have autonomy  to regulate inlrastate trucking. However, the
federal government encouraged state governments  to undertake similar deregulation  within
their own jurisdictions. sc  rdevised a plan for harmonising federal trucking regulations with
state regulations through a series of bilateral agreements  between the federal government and
the states. These agreemenl.s  were expected  to be finalised  by March 31, 1991.16  Altflough
some states, such as Chiapas, have deregulated  intrastate trucking,  the harmonization
agreements  have not been finalised yet. SCT recognises  that the progress with bilateral
agreements  has been much slower than planned. SCT also has doubts regarding the legal
authority of the Federal Competition  Commission  to eliminate  intra-state tariffs, schedules  and
reserved routes. The continued lack of harmonization  between federal and state-level
regulations, if unaddressed. could lead to a bottom-up backtracking of regulatory reforms,
affecting market power as well as environmental  and safety objectives -- with the possible
rebuilding of cartels at state level, and conflicting stringency  requirements  regarding
environmental, safety and Nveights  and dimensions  standards.
Postreform gradual adjustment-attempts to revive the cartel.  The  former market
intervention  policies through segmentation  and control of prices and quantities have left a
strong imprint on postreform market conduct that has continued to manifest itself. Although
regulation by government has been removed,  there has been a natural tendency among
previously favoured  market participants to replace government  control by interfirm
agreements.  The efi-orts  of the Mexican Federal Competition  Commission  have played an
important  role to oppose anticompetitive  practices and complement the deregulation goal of
enhancing market contestability.
In 1994, the Mexican Federal Competition  Commission  carried out an ex officio
investigation  into an alleged absolute monopolistic  practice by CANACAR.  It involved an
agreement among the Chamber's  members to fix the prices applicable tc their cargo iransport
services. The practiae arose from a reference price guide for negotiations  between users and
truckers. CANACAR  hald  written the guide and distributed it among its members. The
15 World Bank  (1995), p.33.
16 World Bank (1990), p.16.
7document specifically established the aim of setting minimum prices for road transport
services. This arrangement between competitors  was found to constitute a violation of the
competition law. As a result CANACAR  was fined on its members' behalf. The Chamber also
was ordered to withdraw from circulation those copies of the price guide already among its
members; to refrain from issuing any other kind of guide with the aim of fixing prices or
minimum costs for the services provided  by its members; and to desist from establishing
pricing policies aimed at creating minimum conditions for the hiring of road transport services.
Subsequently,  CANACAR  consulted the Commission  regarding the development of a cost
accounting  program for its members.  This program involved dissemination  of a costing
method, examples of its use, and training courses or meetings at the national level. To enable
members to use the costing methodology more easily, CANACAR  prepared a questionnaire for
the use of each transport company to identify the elements that make up fixed and variable
costs and to estimate the latter. The Commission  decided that the use of this costing
methodology could lead to greater efficiency  in road transport operations - and was therefore
not in itself a violation of the competition law. In this context, information  on costs could
direct transport companies' investments in more efficient units and assist towards a better
organization of routes. The Commission  did, however, take into consideration  the precedent of
CANACAR's prior price fixing activity. It therefore warned the Chamber that the example on
how to use the methodology would have to be strictly illustrative in nature, avoiding at all
times the possibility that the estimates  it contained  might serve to fix service prices. The
Commission  ruled that the material used to disseminate  the costing method must indicate ithat
the use of methodologies  and estimates as ways to fix prices between competing  road transport
companies constitutes an absolute monopolistic  practice and, as such, is sanctioned by the
competition law.
As another example, in 1997 the Federal Competition  Commission carried out an ex
officio investigation on possible anticompetitive  practices in the transport and distribution of
diesel fuel. The investigation determined  the existence  of agreements (1) to divide markets into
geographic zones for the purposes of transport and distribution and (2) to limit supply of
transport services for fuel oil, in order to strengthen  the ability to divide markets. The market
division of transport services included two explicit agreements,  with the allocation of explicit
distribution concessions that acted as entry barriers. In one, transporters divided the transport
to consumer enterprises of the product sold directly by Pemex-Refinacion,  with the tacit initial
acceptance of this parastatal enterprise. The other consisted of the division of transport services
of hydrocarbon sold by two distribution companies,' 7 with their consent and participation.  The
Commission declared the practices illegal, imposed dissuasive economic sanctions, and
promoted conditions favouring  competition, ordering the producer-distributors  to assign routs
in a transparent manner.
Regarding subsidies, some official entities have in the initial years following deregulation
still rewarded affiliation to trucking chambers. For example,  the National Bank for Public
17  The  two companies  were Distribuidora  de Combustoleo  de Cd.  Juarez and  Distribuidora  de Combustoleo.
8Works and Services (BANOBRAS,  Banco Nacional de Obrzs  y Servicios Pablicos) reportedly
required a letter from CANACAR  to ensure the suitability  of the trucking company as potential
beneficiary for loans at subsidised  rates in the early years following deregulation.  Our
empirical work corroborated that carriers who are not affifiated  to trucking chambeirs-often
small-owned operators-do  not have either the information  or the access to any available
subsidised loans.
Without doubt, the continuing presence of trucking chamrbers  has fiacilitated  incumbents'
control over service supply in some regions. Their contact network has continued to function
as an instrument to disitribute  higher  volume cargo among their members. Neverthe'less,  the
forceful interventions of the competition agency,  together with the development of formal
freight forwarders  has gradually eroded CANACAR's power, particulazrly  in intermodal
transport.
2.2 Regulations and relatedpolicy  instruments
Road transporl:  regulation  was encompassed  in the Law of General Communication  Modes
(Ley de Vias Generales de Comunicaci6n)  and its accompanying  implementing  regulation.' 8
For road transport. this law was replaced on December 22, 1993  by the Law of Federal Roads,
Bridges and Trucking (Ley de Caminos,  Puentes y Autotrans,orte Federal), and supplemented
on November 22, 1994  by the Regulation for Federal Cargo Trucking ('Reglamento  para el
Autotransporte  Federal de Carga).'9
2.2.1 The preregulatory  r eform environment
Market access. Federal policy strictly controlled  entry. Entry regulation differed for  public
for-hire trucking companies and for  private own-account  trucking fleels that are owned and
operated by firms :in  other industries  primarily for their own purposes. Main restrictions were
on entry to operate on ifederal  highways, on cargo movement  between established corridors, on
cargo assignments,  on container handling, and on the handling of cargo at railroad stations and
international  borders:
*  Mandatory concessions based on agreement from incumbents. T'o  provide public
general freight services, truckers were required to obtain a federal trucking concession
from SCT. Concessions were specific to class of service, route, number of haulage
units that can be used, and technical characteristics. By law, the concessions granted to
any individual could not be for the operation of more than five vehicles. Cormpany
affiliation for a concession holder was compulsory. If am  individual was grarnted  such a
concession for general freight, he still had to be accepted by an established company
and this constituted an impassable barrier to entry. The administrative procedures for
determining the need for additional service depended on the opinion of existing service
providers. Incumbent firms had both preferential treaktent  whenever it was necessary
18  Reglamento al Capitulo de Explotacion de Caminos  y de la Ley de Vias Generales de Comunicacion. For
a detailed analysis of this regulation, see Davila Capellaja (1994).
19  Dates reflect publication in the official gazette (Diario Oficial de la Federacion,).
9to increase the number of trucks and the right to object to future increases in installed
capacity. These procedures strengthened the position of existing firms and led to the
formation of cartels.
*  Reserved routes. The country was divided into eleven corridors and each trucker
needed a concession to operate within a specific corridor. By being route-specific, the
concession system controlled installed capacity for each corridor, creating a ceiling to
ton-kilometres per route. The corridor system favoured existing spatial concentration
since the corridors tended to radiate from Mexico City. Down-time was high and load
factors low as the restrictions constrained their options for back-hauling and made it
more difficult to match their supply with available demand. For shippers requiring
cross-corridor shipments or requiring services beyond the established route capacity,
special arrangements with higher tariffs permitting the use of trucks allocated to other
routes had to be made. This segmentation was critical to prevent market forces from
generating more competition.
*  All traffic through freight centers. Truckers must load and unload cargo at specified
freight centers (centrales de carga) and shippers must channel requests through these
centers. While originally motivated by economies in provision of common services
(such as provision of spare parts, insurance and paperwork), many freight centers
began limiting entry and forming cartels in the assignment of cargo. Moreover, freight
centers were increasingly reluctant to grant return-load facilities to other centers even
on the same route, and opposed allowing vehicles from other routes to operate within
their service area even when transport was in short supply. Centers at ports or border
zones were even more restrictive because cargo could be easily centralised and
controlled.
3  Monopoly provision of intenational  container movements. Multimodal, a semipublic
company granted monopoly status for the handling of international container traffic,
was created by SCT in 1981 - with the exclusive right to provide door-to-door
multimodal services. Collusion between Multimodal and the freight centers led to a
system of surcharges and unofficial payments which often far exceeded the stated
tariffs. Service standards were low and deliveries often delayed, resulting in a tendency
for container traffic to be confined to port areas (and thereby foregoing the benefits of
door-to-door delivery). In addition, customs regulations did not permit import-bearing
containers that were temporarily brought into the country to transport domestic
cargoes, resulting in empty outbound movement of containers.
*  Limited licenses for cargo handling. SCT granted concessions for handling cargo
movements at railroad stations and border customs facilities as well as for the drayage
services to cross the border. In most cases, goods could not be moved without the,
services of the concessionaire. As with other concessions, entry was limited and cartels
were formed.
For private own-account carriers, permission  was required to haul their own goods. 'Private
fleets could not compete for back-haul and more broadly were not allowed to transport third-
party cargo, again segmentation to prevent competition  but in practice leading to sizeable
unused capacity in the system. Eventually, a temporal  permit allowed private truckers to offer
10their services  when public companies' supply was insufficient.  However,  private truckers were
sanctioned  with the loss of the truck if they offered the service wit;hout  acquiring the permit.
Companies that offer specialised  freight services  were regulated under separate rules.
Specialised freight services included haulage of hazardous  materials, objects of high volume or
great weight, securities, industrial cranes and cars direct from the factory. These carriers
required a different permission, but then could haul on all the federal roads. However, they
could only operate the registered specialised  trucks and transport a restricted nimber of
specific cargoes (a subset of animals, perishable food, bottled liquids, construction  and
electrical material, furniture, automobiles).
With respect to international  competition, though cargo trailers were allowed to cross
international  borders and proceed to their final destination,  the tractors (power units) were not
permitted to cross borders, neither by Mexico nor by the United States. Drayage services have
developed to undertake  the exchange of power units at the border. The regulations for these
services vary depending on the cities and states involved on both sides. In most cases the
Mexican drayage firms are allowed to bring and take trailers across the U.S. border within a
commercial  zone l[imited  to the urban area at the border. The U.S. drayage operations are
generally more restricted as a result of Mexican regulations, at times not permitting border
crossing nor the pick-up of return loads. 20 An additional difficulty  has been that the high-
growth in-bond assembly (maquiladora)  industries  have:  not been permitted to transport their
own products in their own private fleets. Finally, foreign  carriers wvere  prohibited from owning
Mexican trucking cornpanies.
In additio:n  to Federal  regulations that affect interstate  traffic, some states have restrictions
that affect intrastate movement of cargo. In some cases, concessions are required for specific
cargo and/or route movements on state highways. A review of state regulations in Chihuahua,
Jalisco, Puebla, Veracruz and the state of Mexico  has indicated that state regulations have not,
in general, posed major issues as exclusive intrastate  traffic is not very significant  in
comparison to interstate transport. Nevertheless,  state regulations have been found to affect the
movement of some agriculture, forestry and construction industry products. 2'
Market conduict.  The cartel-like  behavior stimulated  by tight entry restriclions profoundly
affected market ccinduict.  Trucking companies especially small operators  that offered similar
services and loaded freight in similar locations were compelled to establish societies (lineas de
concesionarios)  and offer their services through freight centers. Some freight centers (like the
ones in Mexico City and Guadalajara)  reportedly restrained themselves to leasing spots to
trucking firms that had direct contact with their clients, stamping the loading documentation
(talones de emnbarque)  and promoting  with the authorities  sanctions against those who offered
the service without legal allowance.  Other centers (like ihose in M:atamoros,  Veracruz and
Tampico) acted as inescapable intermediaries  between truckers and shippers,  preventing direct
20 For a detailed  account  of truck-related  border  crossing  problerms,  their persistence  after  regulatory  reforms
and their associated  high  transactions  and congestion  costs,  see Giermanski  (1995).
21 See World Bank (1990),  p.14.
11negotiation between carriers and shippers. They determined  who carries a shipper's load,
destroying carmers' incentives  to build up reputation. Some freight centers compelled truckers
to follow a roll call, first-come first-serve  queuing system when loading freight.
The fixed terms dictated by the freight center for the provision of the loading and delivery
service were extremely generous:  loading, one day; each 200 kilometres-segment  transport,
one day; unloading, one day. The sanctions  for delays  were restrained to partial losses of the
rate, which favoured  trucking companies:  from I to 5 days, 5 percent; from 5 to 10 days, 15
percent, more than 10 days, 30 percent. This created incentives for excessively long delivery
times, enabling the vehicle to wait a substantial  time in order to find a return-load and not need
to return empty. Thus, a trip from Mexico to the nearby city of Cuernavaca (a roughly 60-
minute trip by car) could take 8 days with the shipper being required to pay 95 percent of the
prescribed tariff. On the other hand, shippers  who did not pick up their freight within the first
48 hours after cargo arrival to the destination  had to pay warehousing charges. 22
Important additional regulations or the lack of appropriate  regulations affected vehicle
maintenance and loading practices, vehicle fleet purchasing  practices, as well as related safety
and environmental  practices. Main areas included:
*  Absence of dimension and weight regulations. Mexico lacked any regulation
controlling vehicle weight and size. Axle overloading (excessive weight per axle) was
suspected to be most serious on roads connecting major port areas, where cargoes are
concentrated and heavy industries are located. Overloaded axles cause severe damage
to highway pavements and bridges, which in turn increases the risk of accidents, limits
road life and raises maintenance costs.
- Absence of technical vehicle safety regulations. Mexico also lacked an inspection
system to monitor vehicle safety. The present system allows potentially dangerous
vehicles to use the public roads. At least 7 percent of accidents are due to vehicle
factors such as bad tires and brakes. The proportion of number of persons killed on
Mexican highways to the number of accidents was six times higher in Mexico than in
Sweden. 2 3
*  Fleet purchase restrictions. The automotive industry, consisting of auto, truck, bus and
parts producers faced numerous restrictions which greatly increased the effective costs
of vehicle purchase and maintenance. For automotive production, the effective
protection in 1989 was estimated at about 50 percent compared with a 15 percent
average for manufacturing as a whole. In addition, imports of tractors and trailers were
prohibited.
*  Absence of environmental regulations. Mexico lacked any norms controlling truck
noise and air pollution. There were also only minimal programs in place affecting the
quality of fuels.
*  Exemption from taxation. The Mexican transport sector was exempt from income taxes
as well as value added and ownership taxes. Instead, since 1966, truckers were required
22 This  account is based on Davila (1994), p.129.
23 The latter is based on a rough estimnate  by World Bank staff.  See World Bank (1990), p.17-8.
12to pay a direct tax that was a fixed amount per operated vehicle. The armount  varied
according to the type of vehicle and service rendered, but was very small. The
ecclusiorn  provided a significant avenue for tax evasion since a manufacturer could start
a trucking operation to escape corporate income taxes.
Prices.  Fixedjprces for routes. Official trucking tariffs were set by SCT, presumably
above the corapetitive level and high enough to balance, on average, both fixecl  and variable
costs and yield "reasonable" profits. The rate was uniform for all seasons and for all regions of
the country. l'he rates were classified in five different categories,  each with its own variable
factor per ton-kilometre. However all the categories shared the same fixed factor per ton. The
classification complied  loosely with the difficulty  of handling different products, and it
discriminated  between the value of the goods. Trucking companies  provided the cost
inforr.nation  that the authorities evaluated and used as a reference  :For  setting rates, but rates
often bore little or no relationship  with the costs of a specific shipment. Concessionaires  were
not allowed to chaLrge  prices above or under the authorised rates. 24 Neither could private
truckers charge over or under the official rates when meeting extraordinary  demand for the
service. 25 Additional application  rates set values for other services such as pick-up delivery,
exclusively  served customers, empty back-hauls and warehouse spaces.
Insurance  liability limitations for carriers.  Trucking companies' responsibi:Lities  for
damaged or missing freight were uniformly established for all the different kinds of cargo and
were explicitly limited to very reduced quantities,  unless the shipper paid an additional fee in
proportion to the declared value of the good. The government  had fixed the ceiling on the
trucker's responsibiliity  for cargo loss or damage to only US$0.3  l/ton. A further regulation
prevented negotiation of incremental  insurance by fixing the rate at which the shipper could
insure his cargo irrespective of the product-specific  shipping risks (at 3 mills per declared
value).
Non cost-reflective  tariffs. While overall road costs were being recovered, there were
important cross-subsidies  between automobiles  and trucks. By 1989,  trucks were only paying
for a small fractioin,  roughly 15 percent, of the costs thali  they caused to the highway network.
This was essentially clue  to the relatively low Mexican price of diesel fuel, which in late 1989
was roughly IJS$0.65;/gallon,  insufficient  to allow adequate cost recovery, coupled with the
absence of significant  license fees or direct taxes levied on truckers. 26
2.2.2 Regulai'ory  refiorm
Market access. The basis of the deregulation  program was that private investment and
competition in trucking would be encouraged  and the development  of multimodal
transportation  would be pursued. The new access regulations included:
24 Some  specific  products  such as corn,  wheat,  rice, sorghurm,  sugar,  salt, cement,  coarse  sand,  gravel,  sulfur,
coal, raw oil and gasoline  were subject  to an 8%  discount  that functioned  as a cross  subsidy.
25 See  Davila (1994),  pp. 127-128
26 World Bank  (1990),  p.  19.
13*  Free entry into trucking with a simple permit. Any trucker wishing to operate one or
more trucks need only prove his identity and vehicle ownership to get a federal
trucking pernit.  The changes abolished both limits on the number of concessions and
on the partnership of incumbent trucking companies in the allocation process of new
concessions. Specialised trucking firms are treated equally, allowed to transport any
cargo whenever their trucks were technically suited for doing so. Private own-account
operators are allowed to transport third-party cargo. All restrictions on backhaul are
eliminated.
*  Free entry on all routes. Trucks have been freed to offer their services and transport
interstate cargo throughout Mexico. Direct shipments between former corridors are
permitted without additional costs.
*  Traffic can flow independently of freight terminals. Truckers do not have to belong to
freight centers to obtain cargo and shippers are free to use the trucker of their choice.
Freight centers no longer control cargo shipments nor certify the bill of lading.
*  Free entry into container handling. Entry into the provision of multimodal services has
been opened up and containers can be transported without Multimodal's  services. In
January 1990, customs regulation restrictions on the use of international containers for
the transport of domestic cargo were lifted.
*  Free entry into cargo handling. In January 1990, new regulations forbid giving
exclusive rights for the provision of cargo handling services in federal areas,
specifically at railroad stations, customs facilities and border crossings (drayage
services). Any operator with a federal trucking permit is automatically allowed to
provide such services.
The current Regulation for Federal Cargo Trucking establishes the following requirements
to obtain a permit: (1) fulfil the registration form that SCT issues (what it must include or
maximum permissible items to include are not specified in the Regulation); (2) show evidence
of third-party damages insurance; (3) declare the vehicle characteristics;  and (4) show the
certificate of low pollution emissions. For the case of incorporated  legal entities (personas
morales), the regulation also requires them to show the constitutive  deed (escritura
constitutiva) which establishes trucking service as their main activity (Arts. 7 and 9). The
authorities' response to the application  must not exceed thirty days (Art. 15).
With respect to international  competition, foreign carriers are still not permitted to make
use of federal roads for international  transport.  NAFTA established a schedule of liberalization
of the transportation  sector in three, five and ten years. However, integration of systems
between the United States and Mexico has been slowed by a U.S. unilateral decision to
postpone NAFTA in trucking. 27 Foreign carriers are not allowed to own Mexican trucking
companies until 2004. One positive development  is that January 1990 changes have permitted
the maquiladoras to transport their own products in their own trucks across the border.
27  Based on arguments of divergent coordination in standards, lack of security in Mexican main highways
and low  technology  of Mexican  carriers. See  Ibarra-Yunez  (1999),  p.6.
14Althoughl  the federal government developed  a plan of action for federal-state
harmonization of trucking regulation, the federal government has no jurisdiction over
exclusive intrastate transport on state or local roads.
Market conduct. Deregulation  eliminated  all restrictions on routes. It defined a new
unitary route for public trucking that embodied  all the roads of fedleral  jurisdiction. Since it is
no longer mandatory to contact clients through freight terminals, shippers  have direct contact
with their preferred trucking company and can make their choices on the basis of quality and
price differernces.  Otlher  regulatory changes  include:
*  Liberal dimension and weight regulations. Mexico introduced very liberal vehicle
weight limits?W 2 Among  the consequences are that Mexican roads need to be
constructed at higher standards and costs than U.S. roads. In turn, Mexican vehicle
operating;  costs per unit of cargo are much lower as the higher road costs are not
recovere(d  in road user charges. On the other hand, regarding vehicle length limitations,
Mexican standards are typically more restrictive than U.S. ones. In particular, Mexican
standards do not allow the haulage of 51 feet trailers, the most common U.S. size. In
practice, the size and weight limits are rarely enforced, due to the absence of sufficient
platform-.scales. An insufficient number of inspectors also lack mobile umits  and there
is a reported lack of scales to enforce the weight regulations. This is an area where the
authorities and trucking representatives of both eciuntries  are still negotiating to reach a
mutually acceptable agreement, under the guise of the post-implementation
negotiations of NAFTA. If Mexican trucks are allowed to operate up to their own
weight limit, Mexican operators would be at an advantage over U.S. operators and rail
transport. On the other hand, if U.S. standards are adopted, Mexican operators will be
disadvanl:aged  as' their vehicles are designed to carry much higher loads and therefore
have higher unit operating costs.
*  Liberalization of fleet purchases. The regulations governing the automotive industry
were changed to ensure that truckers are able to purchase Units of international quality
at international prices. Starting with model year 1991, the import of tractor-trailers was
allowed if domestic prices exceed the international level, and for 1992 also  heavy
trucks. In addition, restrictive regulations on the organization of truck p:roduction, such
as national integration requirements, compulsory incorporalion of domestic
components into vehicles and the majority national ownership requirement have been
eliminated. The privatization of the national truck producer DINA in the early 1990s
and the market entry of aggressive truck producer 3  like Mercedes and V'olvo with
financial lending leverage was critical.
Level-playing field taxation. Within the 1990 budget approved by Congress, the
exemption of the trucking industry from income, vialue  added and ownership taxes was
eliminated.
Prices. The reform abolished official rates. The current regulation explicitly establishes
that truckers rnust freely determine rates (Art. 65). These amendments  fostered quality
differentiation of the service, as rates reflecting  differing quality were now freely negotiable
28  See World Bank (1994), Table 3.2, p.67.
15directly between trucking service providers and users. As a complement,  to protect shippers
from cargo loss or damage, the regulation establishes  that trucking companies will pay the
equivalent  to the declared  value by the shipper (Art. 84). On December 1, 1989, the price of
diesel was increased by 5.6 percent and this increased cost recovery to the highway network
from trucks from roughly 15 to 50 percent.
3. Market Structure and Entry
3.1 Evolution of industry structure
A dramatic increase in haulage units. Between 1989 and 1996,  the number of haulage
units increased from 164,010  to 315,318 (a 92 percent increase, or 13 percent per year,
significantly  higher than the economy average growth rate). The most striking increase was
between 1989 and 1992,  precisely concurrent with the regulatory reform period. As shown in
figure 1, the total number of haulage units increased most dramatically between 1989 and
1990, by 36 percent, and by another 24 percent between 1990 and 1991.  By the end of 1991,
available capacity was more than 60 percent higher than in 1989. The total increase between
1989 and 1992  was of 85 percent (growth from 1989  to 1994 was 91%).29  What is also
striking from figure 1 is that in spite of the 6.8 percentage fall in number of registered haulage
units between 1993 and 1994, the number of units in 1996 had again surpassed 1993  levels,
suggesting a relatively minor consolidation  to date.
This dramatic increase can be explained  by: (1) the entry of new firms; (2) the expansionL
of existing firms through acquisition of new haulage units; and (3) the legal registration of a
number of formerly nonregistered firms (the transportistas  piratas). As could be expected, the
rigid regulatory restrictions not only stimulated  collusion among formal truckers but
simultaneously  led to the development  of a substantial informal trucking sector. This sector
was comprised of small-owned  operators (transportistas  piratas) who avoided all legal
constraints. Even though informal truckers could not take advantage of scale economies,  they
avoided indirect costs, did not pay taxes nor any other required fees. The transportistas  piraw'as
did not have offices or any other kind of administrative  costs, and they secured their freight
through informal freight forwarders (coyotes).
3 0 As a result of easing entry  barriers, many
informal carriers decided on their own to register with SCT and avoid the risks and costs of
operating illegally.
In order to assess the extent of new entry as opposed to relabelling of existing trucks fro-m
informal to formal status, it is important  to examine  the numbers in greater detail. By the end
of August 1990, a total of 50,694 federal road permits for freight transport had been issued. Of
this total, 30,153 (60%) were for new entrants, 13,830 (27%) for previously illegal operators.
29  In addition  to being driven  by the dynamics  of regulatory  reform,  a portion  of this increase  may also be
related  to the prospect  of NAFTA,  even though  in the early years  its subsequent  passage  was far from taken
for granted.
30 Even  though  one of the main outcomes  of trucking  deregulation  was the inclusion  of most of the informal
truckers,  some still  subsist  to avoid remaining  regulations  including  taxation.
16and the remainder (13%) for expansion  of existing fleets. 3' Based on this evidence, the most
important group accounting for the increase was new entrants, suggesting that the amount of
competition among truckers may have increased substantially.
The combination  of lower tariffs and improved service reportedly has induced some
agricultural and industrial producers to give up their own in-house:  truck fleets. They now
outsource and contract  their transport services  from public providers. It is the elimination  of
some of these private fleets which has provided a significant  portion of the physical vehicles
for the expansion of the public for-hire fleet. 32
A preponderance of small owner-operators.  Under the preregulatory  refarm period, in
theory there were no 'large  companies since no individual  could be granted more than five
vehicle franchises.  In practice, however, some individuals controlled  up to 500 vehicles
through nominees. In any case, prereform official  data vwas  therefore not particularly
meaningful. Bly  1996.,  the 315,318 haulage units were divided among 60,531 registered firms.
Of this total number of firms, 90 percent were owner-operators  (between 1-5 trucks), 8.3
percent were small firms (6-30 trucks), 2 percent were niedium firms (31-  100 trucks) and a
further 3 percent were large firms (plus 100 trucks). Both the large number of owner-operators
(54,292) as well as the relatively small number of large firms  (187) are striking, as highlighted
in figure 2. Of course, in terms of number of haulage units controlled by each size class, the
large firm category becomes more significant,  with almost 10 percent of units (9%).
A dual segmented structure of technologically  more advanced, concenirated large
firms and low-technology,  small fringe firms. Although large firms are relatively small in
numbers,  with 18  7 in  1996 (up from 148 in 1988), their market and contracting  access and
greater technological sophistication  has reportedly maintained the system as a r  elatively
concentrated, dominant firm market structure. In 1994, the large firms with more than 100
trucks represented 65 percent of national haulage and 87 percent of transborder transport. 33 The
large firms provide services based on long-term contracl:s  and cover main routes, while owner-
operators and small firms cover short hauls, urban markets and cargo consolidation.  Tentative
evidence of th,e  degree of segmentation  is provided by evidence that: (1) large manufacturing
clients of trucking finns generally  do not use fringe carriers or subcontractors  in case of
nonanticipated  demand; (2) large tucking companies generally  do not consider lower prices of
fringe companies as a signal of price competition;  and (3) reputation, differentiation  of service
and quality are present in large trucking firms and not evident in the residual short haul
cariers. 34
31  World  Bank (1995),  p.29.  'Previously  illegal  operators'  are those that  indicated  start dates  prior to July
1989  but that were not previously  registered;  reporting  was likely  to be truthful  as there  were no ex post
sanctions  for such  prior illegal  activities  though  the number  in this  category  may  have  beern  substantially
larger, at the expense  of the 'new entrants' category.
32  Worild  Bank (1994),  p. 9.
33 As reported  by Iba[rra-Yunez  (1999),  p.7.
34 Based on a survey of i13 leading  trucking  carriers  (accounting  for 26% of total road  freight  transportation)
and 25 manufacturing  producers  users  of trucking  services  in  Northeastern  Mexico  in 1993  and updated  in
1995. Out  of the 25 industrial  users, 18 did  not use fringe  carriers  in case  of non-anticipated  demand,  and
17In response to the continuing foreign ownership  restrictions, non-Mexican companies have
to hire the services of domestic carriers who haul the trailers within Mexico. These regulations
have fostered formal agreements and alliance between U.S. carriers and the larger Mexican
trucking companies. Some of them prefer exclusive  partnership arrangements (for example
J.B. Hunt of U.S. has a partnership arrangement  with TMM of Mexico) while others develop a.
network of cooperative  ventures (such as Contract Freighters  Inc. that works with more than 20
Mexican companies). 35
A relative scarcity of trailers. Another structural feature of the Mexican industry is the
scarcity of trailers relative to motor units (both two and three-axle tractors and integrated
trucks). While U.S. motor carriers typically operate 1.5 to 2 trailers for every motor unit, in
Mexico, the ratio was 0.3 in 1989,  rising to 0.5 trailers per motor unit by 1996 (figure 1). The
obvious result for U.S.-Mexico  trade is an overreliance  on U.S. equipment in cross-border
traffic. Put another way, the thousands of U.S. trailers operating in Mexico are there by
necessity.16  This point is related to the fact that Mexican truckers are undercapitalised  and they
thus take every opportunity  to operate without further capital outlays. In this context, it is
interesting  to note the increase in capital expenditures between 1989 and 1995 that underlies
the rise in trailer to motor unit ratio over that period.
3.2 Industry conduct and intensity of competition
Prereform  low-quality  equilibrium.  As a result of the rigid prereform  system, informal
truckers found a market segment  that was willing to take some risks in order to pay lower
rates. It therefore appears that even under extensive regulation, the low-end of the Mexican
market had a certain degree of competition,  with illegal operators offering bargain prices. The
biggest impact of the regulatory regime appears to have been in limiting the supply of higher-
quality logistics services. For shippers that required better and faster service, it apparently
could be obtained at a negotiated higher-than-official  price. But even a larger trucking
company could in general not position itself to consistently provide such a service due to peer
monitoring and due to the impersonal system for matching loads and truckers. Consequently.
no one invested significantly to improve quality, though there appears to have been some
improvization  to provide better quality service when paid to do so.
The freight center system and CANACAR's intervention usually prevented shippers and
carriers from developing long-term relationships where reputation and quality of service
matters. As illustrated in figure 3, under regulation Mexico had a limited range of quality
available, compared to the United States.  Also note that rigorously enforced U.S. technical
regulations would not have allowed Mexican-style  low-quality  trucking operations in any case.
none of the 13 carriers  used fringe company  pricing as relevant  to their own pricing  decisions. See lbarra-
Yunez (1999).
5 Supply Chain  Directions  for New  North  America,  1995. In addition  to TMM-JB  Hunt,  other  reported
alliances include Celadon-Grupo Hermes, Carolina Freight Corp.-Tresguerras and Yellow Freight-
Transportes Sierra;  see Ibarra-Yunez (1999), p.7.
16ATA (1995).
18Increased intensity of competition.  Two types of measures  -reflecting  changes in intensity
of competition were explored in the enterprise survey. A first question asked carriers to
quantify for 1989  and 1997  the number of direct competitors  whc,  have or may have a
significant impact on their business, asking them to report only the number of competitors  who
can take away significant  chunks of business or from whom they can take away significant
amounts of business. According to this measure, intensity of competition  has increased
significantly across the board, with carriers on average reporting  an increase of roughly 50
percent in numbe:r  of' such direct competitors.  Intensity of competition has increased much
more starkly for smaller firms (less than 30 trucks), who report an increase of over 85 percent,
in contrast to large firms who report an increase of under 20 percent.
A second question asked carriers to qualitatively  rank five different classes of competitors
(small owner-operators,  large for-hire,  private, affiliates of foreign carriers, othler  transport
modes) according,  to intensity of competitive  threat for :heir operations,  both in 1989 and 1997.
On average across al'l carriers, increases in competitive  pressure were reported as coming from
all classes of competitors.  In terms of absolute levels for 1997,  both small and large carriers
report that the largest.  competitive  threat comes from large operators, followed  by competition
from affiliates of foreign carriers. Interestingly,  in terms of changes between 1989 and 1997,
the largest number oifcarriers  reported increases in intensity of competitive  threat coming from
affiliates of foreign carriers. Both small and large firms report this finding. Small firms then
report that the seconci  most important increase comes from large operators, while large firms
feel a stronger change in pressure from other transport mnodes.  Only a minority number of
carriers reported increases in intensity of competitive  pressure from private carriers or from
small owner-operators.
After deregulation,  prices for the existing quality of logistics services have fallen by at
least 30 percent. 37 Moreover, the NAFTA agreement  has allowed large retailers and
manufacturers  to adopt faster and more complicated  logistics systnems,  forcing  truckers to
improve their services. This process is also helped along by U.S. truckers' interest to form
alliances with Mexican truckers. Some U.S. finns work with different Mexican firms with only
a formal agreement for trailer haulage. However, through a few more intensive alliances, some
U.S. truckers are 1ransferring  know-how,  computer software, and equipment. As a result,
higher quality trucking services  are now available in Mexico. However, these services are
offered by only a handful companies and therefore are cquite  expensive (only albout  10 Mexican
carriers own more than 500 vehicles). Consequently,  the price-quality profile of Mexican
trucking changed substantially  (see figure 3).
4. Performance
The followxing,  analysis considers  the impact of regulatory reform in road freight on
industry-specific  and broader economywide  performance.  Although it is always difficult to
isolate the impact of policy from other changes in the economic environment,  attempting to
37 Our surveys  confirtned  this widely  believed  figure.
19quantify the importance of a specific set of policy changes  is even more problematic during a
time when so much else was changing simultaneously  - including concomitant regulatory
changes  in related sectors, a drastic trade opening with Mexico's most significant  trade
partners, important related tax changes, and a severe economic  downturn in 1995. In assessing
downstream  impact, therefore, we focus on the more modest objective of quantifying the
maximum  benefits for selected downstream  users from key road freight logistics innovations.
More generally, the detailed findings from the survey of both carriers and shippers supplement
where possible and corroborate the trends in the official statistics.
4.1  Impact of reform on performance in the roadfreight  industry
4.1.1 Output andprices
Significant increases in output levels. Between 1989 and 1995 the traffic volumes in ton-
km of domestic public road freight transport increased by 52 percent, from 107,243 to 162,827
million ton-kilometres.  The average annual increase per year since reforms began, at 8.6
percent per year is more than double that during the 1980-89  prereform period (3.4% per year).
Interestingly,  the average distance carried increased by almost 30 percent, from 346 to 444 kni,
after having been roughly constant for the previous nine years since 1980. A similar picture
arises based on the volume of freight hauled. Between 1989 and 1995, there was an 18 percent
increase in domestic road freight transported,  from 309.8 to 366.7 million tons. The average
annual increase since reforms began, at 3 percent, again is greater than during the prereform
period (at 2.5% per year). 38 In comparing  these two series of output-related statistics, what is
interesting  to note is that although both increased significantly  more during the postreform
period, distances travelled increased substantially  more than volumes carried, in effect longer
trips to new and further locations.
The survey data collected corroborates  this significant  increase in road freight haulage
volumes since 1989.  Of incumbent  trucking firms reporting data for both 1989 and 1997, total
annual kilometres hauled increased by roughly 60 percent. This increase masks important
changes at the individual  trucking company level, with some firms more than doubling
distances covered, while two of the smaller firms decreased distances covered.
A complementary indicator for freight haulage volume is changes in the number of trucks
by firm. These figures show a clear redefinition of the market structure, with the growth of
freight haulage volumes in the period mainly attributed to larger firms:
*  The average growth rate for trucking firms expanding their fleet was 125 percent: 9 o-ut
of 14 (64%) reported an increase in their fleet;
*  The average growth rate for large firms was 175 percent: 7 out of 8 large firms reported
an increase in the number of trucks, while only 1 reported a decrease;
See IMT  (1997),  Tables  4.1.1-2.
20*  The average growth rate for small firms was 69 rpercent:  3 out of 6 small firns  reported
no changes in the number of trucks, only 2 of them reported an increase and 1 reported
a,  reduction.
The number of states in which a firm has sizeable ciperations  (deriving  at l  east 4 percent of
its total income in terms of inter and intrastate traffic) rnay be a useful proxy for output mix,
reflecting the transport of either existing or new products to new locations. According to this
definition,  trucking firms in the sample were active in between one and ten states,  typically in
two to five states. Based on this indicator,  it appears that regulatory reform and liberalization
of routes was associated with a broader range of services  offered. The largest number of
respondents reported  an increase in the states that accolnt for an important  portion of their
operations, with 5 out of these 6 firms being in the larger size grcuping. Some of these
expanding  firms more than doubled the number of states accounting  for sizeable operations,
from four to eight, o;r  from one to seven. The expansion  in geographical area of operation is
generally associated with the opening of one or more additional termninals  or bases of
operation. However, the fact that Mexico has 31 states and that the largest firm interviewed
operates in only 10 of these suggests scope for continued consolidation  of routes.
Prices fall overall, but fastest in lower quality-of-service segments. Rate analysts in
SCT found that between 1987 and 1994 trucking rates nationwide declined 23 percent in real
terms. One official in SCT estimated  that general cargo trucking cargo rates in 1994  on the
major route between Laredo and Mexico City were about 30 percent lower in real terms than
the prevailin,g  rates i:n  1987.39  Another study concludes  that while there is only incidental and
anecdotal evidence on changes in truck tariffs, all the e vidence  points to reduction of the order
of 25 percent:  in real terms. 40
T  he substantial reduction in overall tariff levels documented  in available n1ationwide
studies is corroborated by survey results. Almost all do wnstream  users of trucking services
interviewed reported that the cost of hiring a truck had fallen in real terms since 1989.
Estimates of the size of the decline  generally  ranged between 5 anid  15 percent. More careful
probing of aclditional  exogenous factors confirm that there have been significant  declines in
real prices of a given.  service delivered,  though the magnitude of the price change is difficult to
quantify given the variations in the actual service provided. For instance, one shipper estimated
that an additional 20 percent price fall for the originall) available service should be attributed
to the higher quality levels now available, including newer trucks, faster delivery, and more
reliable shipping facilitated by more sophisticated  tracking systerns.  Another shipper estimated
that the price fall would have been even more substantial if it did not incorporate the effect of
new toll roads, which he estimated added 6 percent to the cost of a typical trip.
Regarding rate structure,  there appears to have been an important differentiation  of prices
to reflect diflferentiation  of services  provided to distinct classes of users. Customers who ship
high value-to-weight  components  where timeliness  and reliability  of delivery are critical are
9 World Bank (1995), p.29.
40 World Bank  (1994),  p.8.
21willing to pay substantially more for higher quality service. For such shippers, the logistics
cost generally represents less than 10 percent of the product price. These services are generally
provided by the larger, more sophisticated  carriers. These prices do not appear to have come
down as much, no doubt reflecting the increased quality elements embedded in the price and
the relatively less intensive competition  prevalent  between the larger, technologically  most
sophisticated  trucking fleets. On the other hand, customers  who ship high volume, high weight
products where the logistics cost is substantial  generally seek to minimise transportation costs.
These lower quality services tend to be provided relatively more by the small owner-operators.
These are the prices that have come down most substantially.
4.1.2 Innovations andproductivity
Large trucking firms adopt innovations. Based on survey results, a substantial amount
of innovation in the industry has taken place with almost all significant 'better practice'
logistics improvements  introduced only after 1990.  Importantly,  the more sophisticated
technological  innovations have been almost exclusively  adopted by the larger firms. All large
trucking companies have modernised their fleet, with almost all buying new trucks with
electronic combustion systems  to minimise the use of fuel. Of firms adopting a standardised
process for the purchase, maintenance  and resale of trucks, over 80 percent were larger
carriers. Most large companies also have taken advantage of computer systems to improve
administrative  controls and to upgrade their communications  systems with customers  through
internet use. All large companies significantly  modernised  their freight tracking systems to
ensure timely delivery, with a majority investing in modern satellite or cellular-based
communications systems to institute some kind of tracking system. Note that a number of large
truckers have U.S. based partners who urged them to introduce these innovations.
Innovations  introduced by large trucking companies since 1989 include:
Technological truck-related innovations (e.g., new trucks with  7 out of 8
electronic combustion systems)  (plus 1 in next 2 years)
Irnproved computer systems and administrative controls  7 out of 8
Tnproved tracking systems  6 out of 8 (plus 2)
Improved facilities  3 out of 8
Internet  3 out of 8
Human resources training  2 out of 8 (plus 2)
ISO-900041  1 out of 8 (plus 2)
Driver  teams 42 1 out of 8
Of firms realigning their routes along a reported 'modern hub and spoke system', again
over 80 percent were larger carriers - such systems were typically introduced  in 1993, 1994,
1996 and 1997. It is important  to clarify that because most of the distances can be reached in
less than 24 hours, the hub and spoke system as it works in the United States does not really
41 Truckers identified the ISO-9000 certification as an efficient way to gain contracts with U.S. trucking
firms. Thus, this innovation could better be identified as an answer to trade opening.
42 Trucking companies believe that to maxiimize  the life of the trucks it is better to assign the truck to one
driver, who can be held responsible for it.  They also mentioned that some drivers do not like to share theit
trucks with other drivers.  These are the reasons why driver teams are not considered very useful.
22exist in Mexico. 'Based  on the survey  results, large firms generally focus on a few main routes
instead of having a wide national coverage. The trucking firm with the highest coverage, for
instance, provides road haulage services  only in ten of the 31 states in the country. Large firms
try to maxurLise  their market share in the most profitable  routes (e.g., Mexico City-Laredo,
Mexico City-Guadalajara).  What larger firms reportedly do is maintain loading and unloading
terminals in the main cities, and switch from larger long-distance  to smaller trucks to haul the
trailers within the cilty.  In this way, whenever  a driver arrives to aL  city he can switch trailers
and continue working. There is no need to spend additional  time in loading or unloading, and
the trucking companies do not have to plan their trips i:n  accordanice  with clielnts'  working
hours. Generally.,  the trucks used for deliveries  in the city have a higher average age.
Accordinlg  to a relevant industry study, 43 the three leading LTL (less-than  truck load) U.S.
carriers now have full-time Mexican partners. On the urging of their U.S. partners, these LTL
carriers adopted U.S. style management and operation procedures.  This may partly be due to
the fact that LTL was unheard of in Mexico before  NAFTA and therefore U.S. firms had the
opportunity  to set up systems from scratch. Now LTL delivery standards are almost on par
with those of the U.S., except that the Mexican LTL carriers do not have a large number of
pick-up and delivery points which limits their volume, and they currently do not expect a big
change in volume to enlarge their networks.
Based on qualitative  feedback during surveys, the incentives  to introduce innovations for
larger firms come from the dual imperatives  under the new environment  both to minimise costs
in order to raise profilts  and to improve service quality in order to gain new clients. As
evidenced by the relatively low trailer to tractor ratios, Mexican truckers, especially the small
ones, are undercapitalised.  Following the economic  crisis of 1994,  most of them could not
modernise or expand their fleets. This provided larger firms ample opportunities to invest to
increase their market share. Larger trucking firms are reportedly also conscious that rail
privatization will increase competition  in the sector. Thus, the irrmprovements  in quality are
motivated by a desire to differentiate  their service from both small trucking companies and rail
carriers.
Small truckiing firms struggle to survive. The contrast with small firms is extremely
stark. Some reportedly have introduced no innovations  whatsoever  since 1989, while others
have only been able to limit innovations  to radio communications  or limited improvements  in
office equipment.44  Only two out of the six small firms interviewed  have been able to invest in
fleet modernization and computer systems. Their planled innovations  are more modest in
scope, limited to modernization of existing equipment:
*  Only 3 out of 6 small firms introduced or were planning to introduce technology
innovations in the next two years.
43Supply Chain  Directions  for New  North  America,  1995
44  This finding  of low ar  no investment  in technological  upgrading  by smaller  firms  is consistent  with the
findings  of an earlier suirvey  by Ibarra-Yunez  (1999),  where  he concludes  "reputation,  differentiation  of
service  or quality  were not evidenced  by the survey  from the residual  carriers  of short hauls"  (p.2  1).
23*  Small firms are more concerned to meet adequate spending levels for trucks'
maintenance (3 out of 6). A few of them have trucks that cannot be used because they
do not have the financial resources to afford the repairs. During the crises years they
used old trucks to provide parts for the newer trucks.
*  A limited number have targeted improvement of the most basic administrative controls
(3 out of 6).
*  One company was about to close because it faced stiffer competition that it could not
meet, and it could not recover from the economic crisis.
*  Only one out of six interviewed was undertaking a serious effort to update the fleet,
invest in computer systems and facilities.
In general, small trucking companies do not have direct contact with their clients. They
deal with freight forwarders (formal and informal) or larger trucking firms, and provide the
service within a region. When they were asked how sector deregulation impacted on
innovations,  2 out of 6 answered that higher competition  in prices due to deregulation impeded
the introduction  of innovations.  In the last years they have been mostly concerned about
survival.
Greater client responsiveness.  Perhaps even more important than operational innovations,
trucking companies introduced significant  innovations in their relations with downstream
users. This greater responsiveness  to user needs has been the most widespread adopted new
practice, instituted by over two-thirds of all surveyed carriers  - and typically introduced in the
years 1993, 1995 and 1997.  Again, over two-thirds of the carriers introducing these behavior-
type innovations  were larger firms:
*  Exclusive transport contracts with large clients (adopted by 6 out of 8 large firms, but
only 2 out of 6 small firms);
*  Cooperation with other carriers to improve return capacity utilization (4 out of 8 large
firms, and 2 more will introduce it next year, while only 1 out of 6 small firms has such
contracts);
•  Exchange agreements with other carriers to broaden geographical reach (4 out of 6
large firms, and 1 more will introduce it this year, while only 1 small firm has
exchange agreements).
*  Specialised staff assigned to provide comprehensive logistics solutions rather than
merely taking orders (6 out of 8 large companies, and 1 more will introduce it this year,
while only 2 out of 6 small firms have specialised staff).
*  Standardised process for purchasing, maintaining, and reselling trucks (5 out of 8 large
firms and 1 more is considering to introduce it, while only 1 out of 6 small firms has
such process).
Productivity on the rise. These innovations appear to have had a significant impact on
productivity in the industry. Based on nationwide statistics, productivity as measured by
output measures per employee increased substantially, as traffic volumes measured in ton-
km increased by 8.6 percent per year since 1989 and measured in tons by 3 percent per
24year, while employment increased at less than 1 percent per year (see below). Another
measurable dimension of productivity change, the average age of the entire nationwide
power units fleet (tractors for pulling trailers and integrated tractor-trailers, including an
overwhelming majority of older owner-operated vehicles) has also improved, though only
slightly with the average age falling from roughly 14 years in 1990 to 13 years in 1997. As
shown in figure 4, purchases of new more technologically advanced equipment fell
drastically during the debt crisis years of 1995-96, bujt  have started increasing again.
Projections of fuiture  purchases and renovations anticipate the average fleet age falling to
roughly 6 years over the next decade. 4
Survey resulits  corroborate these nationwide statistbcs:
*  Total kilometres per truck have either stayed corLstant  or increased between 1989 and
1997, on a carrier by carrier basis. Overall, total kilometres per truck increased by 42
percent and total kilometres per employee increased by 75 percent.
*  Average delivery times fell from 2.5 to 2 days (although the average distance carried
was not controlled for in the question and may have varied somewhat between 1989
and 1997);
*  Average truck fleet age of large companies fell from 5.8 to 4.8 years. It rose from 6.1
to 9.7 years for small companies.
4.1.3 Profits, wages and employment
Sharp falls in profit margins especially  by small[er  firms. Based on survey results,
profits defined as pretax operating income as a percentage of revenues fell substantially  in the
industry. The fall in profits for smaller carriers was particularly severe, in the order of 50
percent between 1989 and 1997.  Five out of 6 small firms reported that their profit  margins had
been reduced. Large firms also experienced  falls in profit levels, but more modest ones in the
order of 30 percent. Out of 8 large firms, only 3 reported reductions in profit margins, while 3
more reported no change and one actually  reported an increase in profit margins. 46 These
results suggest that small firms on average had to sacrifice  their profits to stay in the market,
while aggressive large firms found in differentiating  the service by quality an,  answer to stiffer
competition.
Labor reallocation in favour of larger firms. Nationwide road freight statistics indicate
an overall modest increase in employment  in the industry betwe  en 1989 and 1995 of 5.2
percent, from 509.5 to 536.1 thousand average annual remunerated  employees (or roughly 0.9
45  Based on information elaborated by CANACAR from histc rical 1990-97 data from ANPACT and SCT.
46 These findings of low profits even for large firms may be at least in part driven by deterioration in
macroeconomic ccinditions  as a result of the 1995 debt crisis.  Prior to that downtum, an earlier survey of 13
carriers found an average pre-tax profitability of 17% between 1993-94. 'In contrast, average profitability in
the US sector of large carriers was close to 21% between 1989 and 1994. A similar substantial variation in
profitability between large finns was found in that survey, with the leading carrier showing 12% growth in
profitability between  1993-94 while the poorest performer registered a fa]l of 25%.  See Ibarra-Yunez (1999),
p.18.
25percent per year). This increase masks a surprising  increase of 9 percent over the initial two-
year reform period, between 1989 and 1991, followed  by relative stagnation  between 1991 and
1993, an upturn in 1994 and then a sizeable decline in 1995  alongside the general
macroeconomic downturn associated with the debt crisis. 47 The survey results suggest that
there was a substantial reallocation of employment  in the industry. Incumbent small firms
generally stay small, either contracting or expanding  by a few workers. Among larger firms,
less agile firms contract substantially,  with one firm shedding three-quarters  of its work force,
from 1000 to 250 workers, while more aggressive  firms expand substantially,  expanding two,
three or four-fold, with one firm growing from 150  to 720 workers and another from 180 to
447.
4.2 Impact of reform on performance in downstream industries
The survey of users of trucking services focused on three broad types of industries as
representative of different types of common users in Mexico: agroindustrial,  electronics and
auto-parts firms. In addition, two companies that specialise  in the import and distribution of
general goods also were interviewed.  For purposes of analysis, it is useful to group the 15
interviewed  companies into two classes of users: (1) high-intensity  users of road freight
services-shippers  of higher volume or higher weight bulk products where the average
trucking costs account for over 10 percent of sales, consisting of agroindustrial and import
distribution companies (7 companies);  (2) less-intensive  users - shippers of lower volume or
higher value-to-weight  components where average trucking costs are less than 10 percent of
sales, consisting of electronics and auto-parts firms, plus one producer of plastic parts for
phones, printers and other electrical appliances.  In the former category, trucking was always
reported as the logistics service with the most important impact on costs, while in the second
category air freight was frequently mentioned as more important  though efficient trucking
services  were still deemed as essential for the firms' continued competitiveness.  A set of more
detailed follow-up interviews were conducted with two agroindustrial  and two electronics
companies in order to attempt to control more carefully  for other exogenous changes in the
operating environment  facing these firms, as reported in separate boxes (based on the survey
instrument of appendix 2). See appendix  3 for these case studies.
4.2.1  Costs
Lower costs and higher quality. There are many factors that affect the inflation-adjusted
cost of trucking services faced by downstream  user firms. Especially among intensive users,
substantial improvements  in quality-including  reductions in delivery times and transit
losses-have  positively affected the basic product provided, making an assessment of cost
impact less straightforward:
*  Delivery times have decreased substantially according to 6 of 7 intensive users, with
the impact directly linked to trucking deregulation. Better equipment and a reduction in
the number of stops taken by drivers were cited as the key factors responsible for the
4  See IMT (1997),  Table 1.1.4.
26decrease. The average decrease was over 40 percent. Amorng  less intensive users,
delivery times decreased for 2 respondents, and remained unchanged for 4 out of 8.
*  Transit losses have also decreased substantially according to 5 of 7 intensive users,
with higher q[uality  equipment and higher levels cf security provided on federal roads
(especially on toll roads) cited as the main factors. The average decrease was in the
order of 35 percent. Among less intensive users, iransit-related losses also declined for
3 respondents, and remained unchanged for 4.
*  Reduced inventory levels have led to reported cost savings in 4 out of 1]2  responding
firns,  with all four being intensive users. More reliable and rapid transport services
permit user firns  to make more intensive use of both just-in-time delivery of raw
materials, parts and components as well as build-to-order manufacturing for outbound
shipmernts.  In one agroindustry firm interviewed, in spite of increased sales, inbound
inventory levels have fallen on average from 45 tD 18 days, while inventories of
finished goo(ds  have fallen from 7 to 3 days.
*  Direct truckiing costs were reported to have fallen.  in real terns  for 4 of the users, and
all three are intensive users. Reported cost decreases related to trucking ranged from 33
percent to 15 and 5 percent declines. Upon more careful probing during, follow-up
interviews, even those users that reported increases of 5 or 15 percent  in real terms
acknowledged the importance of reversing factors such as increases in the cost of toll
roads or highier  qluality  trucking services as reflected in more rapid delivery times and
significantly lower transit losses.
4.2.2 Innovations and new products
New products - new goods, new areas and direcit  deliveries. Since the onset of
regulatory reformn,  a number of intensive users have reported the ability to deliver new
products to inarket as a direct result of cheaper or higher quality trucking services. 'New'
products can include products that were previously  not available on the market due to
previously  prohibitively costly or inflexible transportation  services,  as well as existing
products thal can be economically  shipped to new areas and new forms of delivering existing
products (direct to customer rather than via wholesalers  or retailers):
*  An expandecl  range of distinct products has been offered by 8 of 13 respondents,
includingo  4 of the 7 intensive users. As a specific example.,  a producer of fertilizer
products reported increasing the range of producl:s  sold from 12 to 32, with sales of
new products accounting for 30 percent of total current sales. Of this increase 70
percent was directly attributable to lower cost and higher quality trucking services,
with the remainder attributable to growth in demand due to the higher ]Level  of fertilizer
use in Mexican fields. As another concrete example, faster delivery times reportedly
have helped a tequila producer expand the number of products (separalte  brands) from 3
to 45, with average delivery times falling by 20 percent (half of this decline in delivery
times is directly attributed to faster trucking services, with the other half attributed to
faster loading and unloading at warehouses and ports).
*  Expansion of sales of existing products to new areas has been the main impact of
improvements in trucking services for a number Df users, including 4 of 12 survey
27respondents. A large Mexican producer of time-sensitive electronic components used
by other downstream firns  attributes 30 percent of expanded sales (which account for
50 percent of current total sales) to higher quality trucking services, with other
explanatory factors behind the increase in new clients being Nafta-related tax changes
and other internal logistics-related changes such as the introduction of bar code tags
and computerised systems for faster and more reliable documentation handling. As
another example, sales in new areas as a fraction of total sales of a company
specialising in the production and distribution of Mexican peppers account for 90
percent of total current sales. Improvements in the quality of trucking services, with
losses from transit-related problems falling from 5 percent of sales to 4 percent of now-
higher total sales and a 10 percent reduction in delivery times, have reportedly played a
significant role in generating these expanded sales.
Direct delivery to retailers or end-users has allowed some user companies to earn
higher net margins. Based on a more in-depth set interview with an agroindustry firm,
the gain from direct delivery was in the order of 0.4 percent improvement in the firm's
operating margin, with the benefit arising from the joint impact of new end-user
customers that receive direct deliveries and the higher net margin on such direct sales
(after controlling for other factors that could also have accounted for increased direct
deliveries).
More efficient logistics systems. Cheaper or more customer-responsive  trucking services
can and reportedly have led to a number of other logistics-related  innovations  within user
finns:
*  Centralizing manufacturing, using cheaper or more efficient trucking to concentrate
manufacturing in fewer locations has led to reported cost savings in at least one firm.
Centralizing warehousing, concentrating warehousing operations in fewer locations
also has had a similar cost saving impact. The joint impact of both factors, controlling
for other factors such as changes in demand and rail shipping, was in the order of a 0.6
percent improvement in a specific intensive user's operating margin.
*  Rationalising loads, both through adopting standard lot sizes and containerization, has
led to further cost savings for some user firms. Containerization, in turn, both
contributes to cheaper transport and can play a role in decreasing damages and losses
during transit. A number of interviewed firms have reported costs savings from these
logistics-related changes, which in turn have generally been introduced only in the posil
deregulation period.
*  Yet another example of improved logistics services has been the emergence of two
large integrated logistics companies, each with about one million square feet of
warehousing space.
4.2.3 Additional economywide impacts
Outsourcing and enhanced rivalry. For a variety of infrastructure services essential for
entrepreneurial  activity, the absence of a well-functioning  market in such services requires
firms to establish in-house capabilities  or forego production. For road freight services, the
28alternative  to purchasing transport services  responsive to specific user needs on the open
market is to invest and maintain a private own-account  fleet of trucks. From an industrywide
perspective, such required fixed cost expenditures  may be prohibitive for cash-starved  new
entrepreneurs.  Altholugh  such costs are not largely sunk, tapping capital markets may not be an
option for prospective entrants lacking reputation.  An imnportant  additional benefit of a more
competitive  trucking market, therefore, is to allow firms to outsource  their transport
requirements,  in e  ffect converting a fixed cost into a variable cost. The benefits from enhanced
new entry and rivalry for markets intensive in the use of trucking services are likely to be
substantial.
Other benefits. As a result of reductions in truck tariffs, SECOFI has estimated that the
overall distri'bution  costs of commodities  in Mexico has declined about 25 percent in real terms
between 1987 and 1994. Deregulation  of trucking also had an impact on the then-publicly
owned railway company, Ferrocarriles  Nacionales de Mexico (FN4M).  The reduction of
trucking rates after 1989 enabled truckers  to compete miore  effectively with FNM, causing
diversion from the railway to truck transport,  particularly during the period 19I89-91  when rail
traffic declined si,gnificantly.
5. Conclusions and Policy Options for Reform
5.1 Successes andf,4ilures of reform
The Mexican trucking sector is going through a radical transif'ormation  following
deregulation and Mexico's entry into NAFTA. Regulatory reform should be credited with
increasing competition. Its impact was smallest in the lower-end of the market that was already
competitive with a large number illegal owner-operators.  Mid- and large-size shippers,
however, hadL  a chance to take advantage  of deregulation  to reduce their trucking costs. With
the overall fiall  in trucking prices, inefficient operators  with inadequate equipment have been
exiting the market. Regulatory reform also had an impact at the upper-end  of the market where
shippers reqirire faster and more reliable service and are ready to pay for it. Under the former
rigid regulation regime, no carrier had the incentive to offer high quality services.  However,
NAFTA gave a bigger boost to this market segment.  VWith  closet trading ties to the United
States, Mexican firms had to upgrade  their logistics operations. Large carriers, often as
partners of U.  S. trucking companies,  have begun to of  ter  improved services.
Main lessons of Mexico's experience for other coLuntries  include:
The positive role of increased competition in the road freight industry in fostering
economywide innovation and growth. Besides expected gains from lower trucking
prices, the removal of access barriers to transport infrastructure matter's  by generating
substanLial  downstream benefits, facilitating entry and new products. D)elivery  times
and transit losses have decreased substantially. More reliable and rapid transport
services hav e permitted user companies to reduce inventory levels and make more
intensive use of both just-in-time delivery of rawv  materials, parts and components as
well as build-to-order manufacturing for outbound shipments. More irnportantly, faster
and more reliable trucking has allowed user comipanies  to offer new goods, both
29introducing previously unavailable products as well as making it possible for existing
products to reach new areas. More customer-responsive trucking services have
reportedly also led to a number of other logistics-related innovations within user firms,
such as centralizing manufacturing and rationalising loads. Finally, some user firms
have outsourced their transport requirements, in effect converting a fixed into a
variable cost and thereby significantly lowering entry barriers.
Successful reform requires careful planning, execution and high-level political support.
A project with the objective of reforming existing regulations and introducing
increased competition must devise a strategy to carefully take into account key
interested stakeholders, both supporters and opponents. In the late 1980s, transport
regulation in Mexico was viewed with growing disdain, particularly as a result of
studies documenting the high economic costs associated with the prevailing system.
The concurrent general program of structural reform was a favourable context for
regulatory reform of the trucking industry. Arguably even more could have been done
in the early stages of implementation to disseminate the costs of the existing system
and the expected economywide benefits from increased competition. Given the
potential for blockage of reforms by the trucking chamber and its members that had
been benefiting from the officially sanctioned cartel, certain key steps in Mexican
planning and implementation include: preparation of the initial reformn  by a small group
independent from SCT (where certain officials who had traditionally had clientelist
relations with truckers or who feared losing their positions could have sabotaged the
initiative early on); presentation of the reforms to recalcitrant truckers as a
'modernization'  effort rather than an antioligopoly competition thrust, with the promise
of soft loans for fleet modernization in exchange for the charnber's non-opposition; a
sequenced deregulation, eliminating tariff ceilings with a lag following the elimination,
of entry restrictions to prevent a possible consumer backlash if the forces of
competition would have been initially too weak to prevent sharp price rises;
unconditional support from the highest political levels, in this case from President
Salinas himself.
- Sufficient attention and resources should be devoted to assist the oversight institution
in adapting to postregulatory reform conditions. Regulatory reform causes profound
changes in the sectoral institution of government that formerly had responsibility for
the regulation. Any regulatory reform effort should assign sufficient resources to assist
the organization in making the transition to postregulatory reform conditions, assisting
with such tasks as defining the organization's new role, reorganizing its structure and
facilitating redeployment of staff.
*  Promarket rules to offset remaining market failures should be introduced concurrently
with removal of distortionary anticompetition rules. Ideally, any new regulations to be
introduced as appropriate complements to a more market-oriented framework (such as
programs of highway safety, control of vehicle weights and dimensions, and
inspections of vehicle emissions) should be implemented at the same time as the
deregulation actions. In this way, there can be a smoother transition from the
government-controlled to the postreform market-determined regime.
*  The competition agency has a critical role to play in any regulatory reform initiative,
both in terms of up-front advocacy and ex post enforcement activities. The national
30competition agency should play a critical role in hlelping  lay the groundwork for
reform, bym aking as compelling a case as possible for the costs of the prereform
regime and for the expected benefits of refonn, through media relations and more
systematic relationships with representatives of consumer and producer interests
(chambers of commerce, small business and entrepreneurship organizations, consumer
protection institutions, consumer groups, local training and research institutes and other
relevant interested parties). In addition to this prereformn  advocacy and education role,
the competition agency must play a careful postreform enforcement role to ensure that
cosy cartel-like behavior stimulated by tight entry restrictions does not persist. It is
very natural lthalt  public policies of segmentation and control of prices and quantities
leave a strong iraprint on postreform market conduct. Inefficient, anticompetitive
public regulation should not be allowed to be repLaced  by socially inappropriate
anticompetitive interfirm agreements. The experience of Alexico is instructive in this
regard. At least three separate strong interventions were required by the Mexican
Federal Competition Commission to discipline attempted anticompetitive practices by
the trucking 'industry  in the years following the irLitial  regulatory refomis.
5.2 Potential beniefits  and costs offurther regulatory reforms
An interesting  indicator of the need for further  reforms can be derived from the perceptions
of providers of road freight services  themselves. Two questions wiere  explored in survey
format, a first on renmaining  problems facing the indust-y and a second on features of the
current legal and regulatory framework  that restrict operations  or inhibit growth.
When questioned about remaining  most important problems facing the road freight
industry, trucking companies were near unanimous  in highlighting  the security problem,
including robberies on highways and additional required  payments and costs, as the number
one outstanding  policy issue (1  1 out of the 14 trucking companies surveyed idlentified  it as one
of three of four key issues, with most listing it first). The second issue in order of importance
was the continuiniig  pressure felt by increased  intensity of competition.  This issue was
reflected in answers ranging from excessive competition  from abroad or from the informal
economy by larger carriers, unfair competition by smaller carriers (presumably  from owner-
operators in the informal sector who avoid all taxes), and as a problem of access of credit by
some small and larger carriers (who  presumably cannot raise finance at suffic:iently  attractive
terms given rates of return in the sector). At least one large carrier reported that they did not
want more foreign firms to enter given their larger size, scale economies and better financing,
which suggests still insufficient (at least international)  competition. A number of the carriers
emphasised  ihat 1hey do not have access to loans at the same low rates of interest as their U.S.
competitors. Interestingly,  the multimodal freight broker surveyed highlightecl  problems of
timeliness of delivery and delays  in service as the most important  problem, suggesting that
competitive  pressure still had not been sufficient  to stirnulate  broad service satisfaction. 48
Finally, the third issue raised most frequently concerns  vehicle roDad  safety, vwith  the issue
48  This view is supported by the Ibarra-Yunez (1999) survey, where 17 out of 25 industrial users responded
in the negative to the question of whether users find supply of iroad  freight service adequate in volume, price-
competitive, complete and dependable (p.20).
31arising either under the heading of excessive number of accidents,  better required control of
drivers, or poor condition of highways (6 of the respondents highlighted one or more of these
topics, with it being one of the two issues raised by the multimodal freight broker as well).
When asked about the more specific question of key features of the current legal and
regulatory framework  that restrict operations or inhibit growth, the most frequently reported
issue related to the weights and dimensions  rules (5 out of 11 respondents). Answers ranged
from absence of rules, lack of clarity of rules to inconsistent application (allowing old, too
heavy trucks to remain on the roads in the case of a modem fleet owner, preventing old, too
heavy trucks to circulate in the case of a struggling,  nonmodernised  company). The second
most frequent issue was the relatively high level of per-truck license payment (tenencia) now
required in order to operate a vehicle, allowing closer to full-cost  recovery of highway
maintenance expenditures. Other issues mentioned  by more than one carrier include remaining
ambiguities in the foreign investment law, and shortcomings  of the labor law. Interestingly,  the
only legal/regulatory  issue raised by the multimodal freight broker was problems with
remaining labor unions in ports, suggesting  that prior legal and regulatory barriers in trucking
have largely been addressed.
Further improvements  in Mexican logistics will materialise only through closer links to the
U.S. truckers. Currently the truly international  market segment is populated by a few Mexican
trucking companies that have established different forms of partnership with U.S. carriers. This
segment is probably awaiting year 2004 when U.S. trucking companies will be allowed to own
Mexican companies. If and when Mexican truckers are allowed to operate into the United
States, it may inject a boost to productivity  improvements.  These developments  will benefit
mainly those parts of the Mexican economy that operate internationally.  As far as logistics is
concerned, there is an enormous amount of know-how and experience  that Mexican companies
could benefit from. Moreover, Mexican companies could benefit from improved logistics
services without incurring substantial  restructuring costs (unlike, say, taking advantage of
equity markets in the United States).
There are three main factors that hold back a full-scale  logistics revolution in Mexico:
*  The persistent segmentation between large, technologically sophisticated providers o f
road freight services and low-technology fringe providers. The parts of the broader
Mexican economy that are not operating internationally still remain much less
developed, relying on informal establishments for distribution and retail sales. This part
of the economy cannot afford and does not seem to need improved services. Luckily
for them there is a large fringe of small owner-operators to provide haphazard but
inexpensive transportation services. In fact, the existence of low quality but cheap
trucking is an important lifeline for small, informal businessmen. However, this fringe
exists at a bigger cost to the rest of the economy. Their technically inadequate trucks
are a threat to road safety, and their inadequate consolidation continues to shelter the
larger carriers from more intense competition.
*  The Mexican govenrnent's  unwillingness to enforce technical standards and maximum
load restrictions. By refusing to implement technical standards rigorously, the Mexican
32government is allowing the informal sector to can.Ty  on. It is allowing a dual structure to
persist that hinders more systemic modernization and more homogenous growth. Better
enforcemnent  of technical standards in trucking as well as in other areas of the small
business enviroiLment  will no doubt put some informal businessmen oult  of work, but
the ensuing consolidation could very well create new opportunities of greater benefit to
the economy.
*  Failure to full  implement the transportation related provis.lons of NAFTA and to
ensure more ]nomnogeneous  federal-state regulatory reforms. Although pressure from
increasecd  intensity of competition is being felt in Mexico, there appears to be scope for
further significant gains from additional competition that a full opening with the United
States could provide, as suggested by users' emphasis on continued service quality
shortcomings. U.S.-Mexico integration has lagged behind the needs of the market, with
negative consequences for Mexico's international competitiveness. In addition, failure
to ensure more homogeneous federal-state regulatory refon:ns risks undermining
progress to-date in the areas of competition, environmental standards anid  road safety
guidelines.
Progress on these remaining internal  and international  obstacles could yield substantial
additional benefits. Indeed, answers  to a final question posed  to users of road fLreight  services
suggest scope for significant  further economywide  benefits from increased trucking service
efficiency. Under the hypothetical scenario that transport  and storage costs could fall by a
further 50 percent, the market value of user firms was estimated  by respective managers to an
average of 20 percent with some firms estimating  up to a 100 percent increase. Under the
hypothetical scenario that the frequency of deliveries  to clients could double  without additional
charges while maintaining the volume of sales constant, similar substantial gains to the value
of user enterprises  were reported.
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34Appendix 1. The Road Freight Industry In Mexico
Mexican  GDP per capita  is about 10 percent  of its main trading  partners,  the United States  and
Canada. With a skewed  income  distribution,  more limited  car ownership,  high degree  of
concentration  in urban areas,  and persistent  poverty  in rural areas,  the Mexican  economy  has
somewhat  difftrent transport  and logistics  needs than its North  American  neighbours.
Mexican  industry  definitions.  Road freight  services  refers to the movement  by trucks of
goods  (raw materials,  capital  goods,  processed  inputs,  finalL  outputs)  for business  purposes  on the
national  road system  (ranging  from rural feeder  roads, urban  roads, to state and nalional  highways),
transforming  a specific good  at a certain  location  and time to the same  good at another  location and
time. Road freight services  are the most important  of all combined  freight and passenger  transport
services  provi(led  in M:exico,  accounting  for 40 percent of gross  value added  of the transport  and
storage  sectors in 1995.  49 Road freight  haulage  units include  power  units (tractors  used to pull
trailers as well as integTated  tractor-trailers,  generally  either two or three-axle)  and separate  trailers.
Services  offered  (depending  on the haulage  units and goods  moved)  are classified  either as general
cargo or specialised cargo movements. Specialised cargo currently includes seven categories:
hazardous  materials,  petroleum  and its derivatives  (via  liquid tanker trucks),  automobiles  direct
from the factoiy (via specialised  vehicles),  tow-trucks,  tow-trucks  for salvage  vehicles, industrial
cranes,  and securities  of credit-related  institutions  (via armnoured  vehicles). 0
In Mexico,  road freight services  are further  classified  according  to three criteria.  The first
criterion  derives  directly  from  the Mexican  regulatory  distinction  betweenfederal and state
trucking  companies,  according  to whether  truckers  have  been granted  permission  to operate  at the
federal level or whether  operations  are restricted  to a single  or several  states.  Most of the available
data omits  information  on firms and individual  haulage  units that are registered  exclusively  with
state authorities. 51 HIoNwever,  this is reportedly  not a major problem  since  exclusive  intrastate  traffic
is minor in comparison  with interstate  transport.  The seconid  important  criterion  is between  public
(third-party,  for-hire)  trucking  companies  andprivate (in-house,  own-account)  trucking  fleets.
Again,  most of the available  data omits  information  on the size and iimportance  of fleet trucks.
About  two-thirds  of total cargo  is transported  through  public  trucking  2 A third  useful distinction
regarding the structure of the industry is between owner-operators (entrepreneurs operating
between  one to five trucks) and larger trucking  firms. Total recorded  federal  public trucking  in
1996  consisted  of 315,318  haulage  units (two-thirds  of which  were power units). These  haulage
units were operated  by 60,531  registered  firms, of which 89.7  percent  were owner-operators.
General  and specialised  cargo services  in terms of volume  transported  represented  89.6  percent and
10.4  percent of the national  total, respectively.  The states  wvith  the largest  number  of haulage  units
4  See  IMT  (1997),  Tables  1.1.1-2.  Total  transport  and  storage  services,  in turn,  accounted  for  7.6%  of gross
value  added  in Mexico  in 1995.
50 Perishable  goods  (via  refrigerated  trucks),  goods  of  high  volumne  or great  weight  (via  specialized  platform
vehicles),  electrical  and telephone  equipment,  construction  materials,  glass,  and agricultural  non-processed
goods and animals  are all examples  of products  that  were previo  usly classified  as requiring  specialized
services but are considered as part of general cargo since 1991.
5  SCT, the federal Ministry of Communications and Transport is currently umdertaking  a rnassive effort to
re-register and re-tag the entire national trucking fleet.  That effcirt  will result in a comprehensive registry
including holders of state-only licenses, but is expected to be comnpleted  only later in 1999.
52 World Bank (1993), p.  7.
35are Distrito Federal (22% of the total), Nuevo Le6n (10.5%), Estado de Mexico (7.4%) and
Tamaulipas (7.3/%).  53
A potentially highly competitive industry. The markets for road freight services are quite
fragmented because of the multitude of destinations (local, domestics, and international), types of
goods to be transported, and multi-modality requirements.
Unfortunately, the potential competition between road and rail freight services has been
minimised in Mexico by the official tariff setting policies, the rigid radial structure of tracks and
the un-addressed operational problems of the state-run rail company. As a result of official tariffs,
railroads mostly carry bulkier, low-value goods, such as raw materials. In 1995, grains accounted
for 20 percent of tons transported, cement 15 percent, primary steel inputs for 10 percent, non-
metallic minerals 9 percent and diesel fuel 7 percent (ointly  over 60%). In contrast, road freight
services overwhelmingly transported manufactured or processed goods, with processed industrial
goods accounting for 49 percent of daily tons carried, agricultural goods 16 percent and various
packaged goods a further 14 percent; with unprocessed mineral goods accounting for 4 percent. 54
Moreover, the initial rail network created a rigid radial structure, with all major routes passing
through Mexico City. Finally, inefficient routing, maintenance and repair operations of
FERRONALES (Ferrocarriles Nacionales de Mexico, the national railway) led to substantial
delays, under-utilised capacity, and frequent non-availability of scheduled train services.5
The dominance of road freight in transport services. It is therefore not surprising that road
freight transport increased its dominance over rail after deregulation. In 1989, road freight transport
accounted for 65 percent of the total and rail 24 percent; the corresponding land surface transport
modal split between road and rail freight was 74:2656  By 1995, road freight increased its share of
domestic ton-km to 74 percent. Average road freight distance was 444 km (of a total of 220.4
billion ton-km of cargo transported). In contrast, rail accounts for 17 percent (average distance of
717 km), maritime transport for 9 percent (630 kin), and air transport for a mere 0.03 percent (862
km).'7 The total movement of cargo over the years has been influenced by the general growth of
the economy, with total cargo transport growing at an annual rate of 1.7 percent per year over the
1980-95 period in spite of a period of stagnation during the mid-eighties. Across modes, road
freight increased at an annual rate of 2.5 percent, rail fell by 1.8 percent per year, while maritime
and air transport had only very minor changes (maritime growing at 0.5 percent per year, air
actually declining at 0.4% per year) 58  In terms of the important U.S.-Mexican trade flows, trucks
carry 77 percent of trade in value terms, rail 9 percent, maritime  10 percent and air transport 4
percent. 59
5  These statistics  are from SCT (1996).
54  See IMT (1997),  Tables  4.3.5 and  4.2.5. It is noteworthy  that  the concentration  of rail transport  on a few
raw materials  has  not changed  substantially  over  the past years. In 1987,  grains accounted  for 24% of ton-
km, primary  steel  inputs 19%,  non-metallic  minerals  10%  and  cement  9%, as reported  in Davila Capalleja,
199x,  p.300.
55 Ibid,  p.296.
56  In contrast,  the road-rail  freight  modal  split  in the US in 1989  was 41:59.
57  Road freight  only  captures  public  transport  and excludes  private  in-house  while rail excludes  cargo moved
for own  purposes. Since the former  surely  is more  important  than the latter,  these numbers  underestimate  the
importance  of trucking  in freight  transport.
s  See IMT (1997),  Table 4.1.1.
59 US Department  of Transportation  (1996).
36Infrastructure shortcomings. Despite heavy reliance on trucking, Mexico has a sparse and
inadequate highway system of only 48,087 km of paved federal roads, referred to as trunk
highways (com.pare  to 'Canada's 800,000). Of this total, roughly 6,000 km are so-called concession
highways, which are privately owned toll roads; this is a recent development, as concession
highways only accounted for about 1,000 km in 1989.60  Although a welcome development, these
new highways are grossly under-utilised, mostly because they are very expensive (a trip from
Nuevo Laredo at the U.S. border to Acapulco can cost a trucker about US$400). The national
system is deepened by an additional 46,000 km of paved state roads, r eferred to as feeder roads.6
Broader transport reform initiatives. An attempt is currently under way to address the
traditional under-utilization of rail in Mexico. As part of a recent effort to restructure and
modeniise the Mexican rail system, the Constitution was reformed in February 1995 to open the
sector to private participation through the awarding of long-term concessions on groups of lines. A
subsequent May 1995 law has created the legal framework for privatization. Licenses to build and
operate railways were granted, with the national grid having been divided into three main vertically
integrated regional companies. The Northeast line (Ferrocarril del Noreste), one of the country's
busiest, was sold to a Mexican-United States consortium ir, January 1997. The Northwest section
(Ferrocarril del Pacifico-Norte) was sold in August 1997, and the Southeast line (Ferrocarril del
Sureste) in June 1998. Interconnection services in the Mex:ico  City valley (Terminal Ferroviaria del
Valle de Mexico) are provided by a separate company joinl:y owned by three big railroad lines.
This structure encourages competition within the rail network via regional comparisons of costs
and prices. Competition with road transport is promoted by eliminating the possibility of cross
subsidies between regions and by stimulating the efficiency of the network.
Mexican ports also have been plagued with problems cif  inadequate equipment, lack of
warehouse or terminal space and poor road and rail connections. Mexican ports have been
decentralised since 1992, with port management -includin o  negotiation of wharfage rates directly
with steamship lines under maximum rate guidelines-- fonnally transferred to newly created
Integrated Port Authorities (APIs) in the second half of 1994. Concessions for container and other
handling services at three of the country's four major ports (Altamira, Lazaro Cardenas and
Manzanillo) were sold during summer 1995. Other port concessions, including handling services in
Ensenada and further such services in Lazaro Cardenas and Manzanillo were sold in 1996-8.
Finally, the aiiport infi-astructure sector also has been operled up. The sale of concessions to
manage the 35 (of 61) airports that do not require subsidised operations has been organized into
four regional groupings, with the sales expected to be completed during 1999.
60 The govermnent  handed  over  the construction  of all four-lane  toll roads  to the private  sector  in the early
1990s.
61  See IMT (1997), Table 6.2.2.
37Appendix 2. Structured Survey Instrument: Fertilizer Company Example
Measurement
Actual  Fraction  of
Definition  of  Were  there  figure  net change  due
the  impact  signiricant  of  to the
What  to  variable  Actual  reversing  reversing  specified  Impact  factor I  Impact  on
Innovation'  Impace 2 Measure?  (historical  data) figure  factors?  factors  innovation  (current  data)  net margin
TRUCKING
Cheaper  or  Reduce  cost of  Cost of hiring  a  Percent  0.15  If the trucker  0.21  1  Trucking  0.21  0.0441
higher  transportation  truck on a  reduction  in cost  do not use toll  costs/sales
quality  standard route  of hiring a truck  roads, they
trucking  since 89 (in real  may offer a
terms or U.S.  further
dollars)  (hypothetical)
discount  of 6
percent.
Introduce  new  Sales of new  Sales 97 of new  0.3  None  0.3  0.7  Net margin  on  0.07  0.0147
products  products (incl.  products  new prods. -
discrete  quality  introduced  since  average net
changes)  89/  total sales  margin
Cover a wider  Sales in new  Sales in new  0.3  None  0.3  0.7  Net  margin in  0.04  0.0084
geographic  area  areas  that are  areas (reached  new areas -
(begin selling  in new reached  by trucks 89-97) I sales  average net
regions or countries  97  margin
reached  by trucks)
Make  direct  Number  of new  Number  of new  2  NO  2  0.6  Net margin  for  0.01  0.0036
deliveries to more  customers (who  direct-delivery  new customers
customers  start buying  from  customers  / total  -average net
you after 1989)  number of  margin
who receive  direct-delivery
direct deliveries  customers  in
1997
Direct delivery  to  Percentage  sales  Increase  in  -0.2  Their  0  0  Net margin  in  0.02  0
retailers  or end  volume  switched  (sales to  marketing  sales to retailers
users allows  from wholesellers retailers) / (sales  strategy  focus  -net margin in
company  to eam  to retailers  (or  to wholesellers)  in increasing  sales to
higher net margins  large customers)  from 89 to 97  the proportion  wholesellers
of whole-
sellers.
Increase  in  0.03  Their  0  0  Net margin  in  0.02  0
(sales to end-  marketing  sales to end-
users) / (sales to  strategy  focus  users - net
retailers) from  on increasing  margin  in sales
89 to 97  the proportion  to retailers
of whole-
sellers.
Higher  quality  Total transit loses Reduction  in  0.01  None  0.01  0.8  1  0.008
trucking services  = uninsured  total transit
limit losses (theft &  losses +  loses/sales  from




Centralize  Concentration  of  Percent  change  8  None  8  0.5  Fixed  0.01  3  0.0052
manufacturing  manufacturing  in production  manufacturing
output per  assets / sales
manufacturing
facility since 89
(in real terms or
U.S. dollars)
Centralize  Concentration  of  Percent  change  3  None  3  0.5  Fixed  0.005  0.00075
warehousing  warehousing  in shipments  per  warehousing
warehousing  assets I sales
facility since 89
(in real terms or
U.S. dollars)
Ability to  lower costs of  the change in the  change in (less  N/A  NO  N/A  N/A  Percent  N/A  0
ship  transportation  fraction of goods  than truck load  savings from
products  shipped without  shipments)/(total  switching away
without  hiring a full truck  shipments)  from  from full truck
hiring a full  89 to 97, in tons  loads
truck  or dollar  value.
38RATIONALIZING LOADS
Adopt standard Lower  costs of  Average size of a  Percent  change  3  Sending  out  0  0.6  Ouibound  0.2  0
lot sizes  handling and  shiprnent  to  in average  larger  truc:king  + other
transportation  customers  (units  outbound  shipments  trans. /total
or tons per  shipment  size  does not leai  trucking + other
shipment)  since 89  to any cost  trans.
savings
Containerization  Decrease  Damagecd  goods  Reduction in  N/A  NO  0.005  0  1  0
damages  and  and losses in  (losses in
losses in transit  transit as a  transit)/sales
percentage  of  from 89 to 97
sales (annual)
Allow cheaper  Increase  in  N/A  End of  0.05  1  Percent cost  0.3  0
transportation  (containerized  government  savings from
opportunities  transport)  / (total  subsidized  shipping in a
transport)  from  container  container
89 to 97  recycling  inslead of other
program  mel:hods  (open
reduced  the  bulk or
growth of  packaged)
containerizatiDn
MODALITY
Exploiting  Lower  Change in the  Increase  in non-  -0.02  Better  trucking  0  0.8  Percent  cost  0.1  0
multi-model  transportation  composition  of  truck transport  /  services  led to  savings from
transportation  costs, faster  transport use  total  a substitution  using other
opportunities  service  (trucks, rail,  transportation  away  from rail  modes instead
maritimel  from 89 to 97  of Irucking
INVENTORIES
Higher  quality  Using  just-in-time Reduction in in-  Reduction  in  1.5  NO  1.5  0.7  Conversion  of  0.003  0.000287
transport  delivery of raw  bound inventory  average  days of  days  671
services  allow  material, parts,  levels  in-bound
more timely  and components  inventory  from
deliveries  or  cuts down  89  to 97
shipments  inventory  levels
Build-to-order  Reduction  in  Chainge  in out-  Reduction  in  -30  Without the  60  0.7  Conversion  of  0.003  0.011506
manufacturing finished  goods  bound inventory  average days of  trucking  dalys  849
inventories  levels  out-bound  improvemerts,
inventory  from  the average




(instead  of  l).
Reduc:tion  in  Obsolete  Reduction  in  N/A  N/A  1  1  0
obsolescence  products written  obsolescence/
off or marked  sales  from 89 to
down  97
WAREHOUSING
Restructure  Lower  costs of  Warehousing  Percent  N/A  0  1  Number  of  N/A  0
and  warehouse  operations require  reduction  in  wcrkers in
computerize  operation  fewer  workers  (number  of  warehousing/
warehousing  workers)/  total number  of




from 89 to 97
Warehousing  Percent  N/A  0  1  warehousing  N/A  0
operations require  reduction in  assets/fixed







from 89 to 97
INSURANCE
Get  Limit losses  Total transit loses =  Reduction  in  0.01  This reduction  0  0  1  0
comprehensive  (theft &  uninsured losses +  total transit  has nothinc  to
insurance  damage)  in  insurance  premiums loses/sales  from  do with
coverage  transit  F loss prevention  89 to 97  insurance.
costs
Cheaper  How  much the  Increase  in  0  NO  0  0  (Loss  claims  0  0
39insurance  company  benefited (insured  from  insurance
costs  (lost)  from  cheaper freight)/(total  companies)/(pre
(more  expensive)  freight)  from  89  miums  paid)  in
insurance  to 97  a typical  year
DOCUMENTATION
Faster  and  Reduce  losses  Uncollectable  Reduction  in  N/A  Increased  0.005  0.3  1  0
reliable  due  to missed receivables  =  uncollectable  workload  of  the
documentation  or untrackable  shipments  lost  or  receivables/  court  system
(enhanced  deliveries  unverifiable  due  to  sales  from  89 to  makes  it
property  rights)  (goods  deficient  97  harder  to
shipped  documentation  prosecute
without  reliable  fraud
proof  of
delivery)
Enhanced  More  quickly  Trade  Reduction  in  N/A  1994  crises  2  0.8  Conversion  of  0.003  0
negotiability  receive  receivables/sales average  days  forced  us  to  days
(liquidity)  payment  for  receivable  from  extend  longer
goods  sold  89  to 97  payment  terms
BOTTLENECKS
Eliminate  Faster  Reduction  in idle  Reduction  in  N/A  NO  0.03  0.2  (Total  trucking  +  0.06  0
bottlenecks  clearance  of  time  (idle  time  =  average  idle  other  transport
formalities  total  time  without  time/total  transit  costs)  / sales
unnecessary movement)  time  from  89 to
waiting  97
Faster  Reduction  in idle  Reduction  in  N/A  NO  0.03  0.3  (Total  trucking  +  0.06  0
loading/unloadi  time  (idle  time  =  average  idle  other  transport
ng  at ports,  rail total  time  without  time/total  transit  costs)  / sales
stations,  movement)  time  from  89  to
warehouses  97
Faster  Reduction  in idle  Reduction  in  N/A  NO  0.03  0.3  (Total  trucking  +  0.06  0
customs  time  (idle  time  =  average  idle  other  transport
clearance  total  time  without  time/total  transit  costs)  / sales
movement)  time  from  89  to
97
TOTAL  9.7%
Notes:  1. Changes  that have  taken  place  at the  firm level  since  deregulation/  increased  competition.
2. Specific  areas  that potentially  could  be affected  by  increased  competition  in trucking  services.
40Appendix 3. Four Case Studies
1.  Fertilizer Coinpany
A Mexican. fertilizer company producing and distributing urea and DAP, creatted  in 1993,
provides one of the starkest examples of the downstream benefits of rmore  competitive, market-
driven trucking services. In terms of inbound logistics, roughly 80 percent of the raw materials
arrive by ocean shipment to the nearest port with the remainder arriving by train from the United
States. In the end, 94 percent of the inbound raw materials make the final leg of the trip to the one
production plant by truck. In terms of finished goods outbound logistcs,  98 percent is transported
by truck to clients, with 70 percent of this total volume accounted for by trucking services directly
contracted for by the company and the remainder picked UI)  at the plant by various larger clients
(retailers) who have their own in-house trucking fleet or outsource it. Inbound and outbound
trucking costs jointly account for 19 percent of total costs. Total trucking costs account for 21
percent of sales (total transport costs, all modes, account fcr 32 percent of sales, of which 65
percent is trucking, 30 percent ocean shipping and 5 percent rail shipping). In terms of number of
trucking service suppliers ideally suited to meet the company's inbound logistics reeds, there was
an increase from 2 to 4; in terms of outbound logistics, the number increased from 6 to 9,
confirming an incrceased  intensity of competition in service supply. In turn, the intensity of
competition at the downstream level has also increased, with the number of direct competitors that
could take over a significant part of its operations increasing from 4 to  10.
The cost faced by this company of hiring a truck on a standard route has reportedly fallen by 15
percent in real terms over the past five years. If the truckers were not to use toll roads, they would
be able to offe:r  the service for an additional estimated 6 percent less. The quality of the trucking
services also increased, with losses in merchandise during transit falling by 50 percent. Of this
reduction in total transit losses, 80 percent is estimated to be due to higher quality trucking
services, with the remaining 20 percent attributed higher levels of security provided on federal
roads. Higher quality transport services also allow more timely deliveries and shipments, with
significant cost reductions from lower inventory holding costs. The average days of inbound
inventory fell 87.5 percent, from 2 days to 6 hours, with 70 percent of this change reportedly due to
improved trucking services and the remainder due to improved market conditions. The average
days of outbound inventory rose from 1 to 2 months, but without trucking improvements the
average outboumd  inventory reportedly would be 4 months (so it is actually 50 percent lower than
otherwise).
These changes, in turn, have had a significant impact on innovat:ions and new products
introduced by the company. Since the onset of regulatory reform, thc company has increased the
number of distinct products that it sells from 12 to 32, with these chEnges reportedly almost totally
due to improvements in trucking services. Sales of new products introduced over the past years
represent 30 percent of total current sales. Of this increase, 70 percent is reportedly directly
attributable to lower cost and higher quality trucking services, with the remaining 30 percent
attributable to growvth  in demand due to the higher level of fertilizer use in Mexican fields. The
41average distance in trucking-based transit from plant to sales points has increased three-fold, from
60 to 180 kilometres, suggesting that many locations that previously were not profitable now have
become so. Delivery times have also been reduced by 50 percent, with a regular trip that used to
take 8 hours now taking 4 hours, reportedly mainly due to better equipment and a reduction in
number of stops taken by drivers. Number of employees have increased from 20 to 60.
Based on an intensive matrix survey instrument administered to this firm, the overall
improvement in operating margin directly attributable to road freight innovations is 9.7 percent:
reductions in trucking costs directly related to road freight innovations accounted for 4.4 percent,
gains from new or improved products accounted for 3.5 percent (including reaching new areas and
more direct deliveries), and savings from improved logistics accounted for the remaining  1.8
percent (including savings from centralized manufacturing and warehouses).62
2.  Vegetable-producing Company
Another type of company where trucking services account for a substantial part of total costs is
an agroindustrial company that produces and distributes a specific class of Mexican vegetable,
peppers. The company sells 10 percent of its production in the Mexican domestic market, exporting
90 percent with all foreign sales going to California (the company accounts for 4 percent of the
entire California pepper market). Trucking costs account for 18 percent of total sales (the company
does not use any other transport modes).
Between 1991 and 1997, the total logistics cost of the company decreased from 42 to 23
percent of average price, with trucking being the logistics service with the greatest impact on costs.
In real terms, trucking costs are reported to have fallen by 5 percent. An important additional cost
element that has been falling substantially is the cost of inventory holdings. Input inventories have
fallen from 45 to 18 days on average, or 60 percent. Inventories of finished goods have fallen from
7 to 3 days. Without doubt, an important driving force of these changes has been the increased
intensity of competition in trucking services, with the number of providers that can offer the
required specialised trucking delivery services of finished goods for this type of company
increasing three-fold, from 5 to 15.
Since 1991, sales in new areas as a fraction of total sales account for 90 percent of total sales.
The respondent was not able to estimate, however, the extent to which this increase was due to
cheaper or higher quality trucking versus other factors. Certainly, idiosyncratic factors such as the
development of an array of personal contacts in California played a big part in the increased
potential sales outlets. Improvements in the quality of trucking services, however, were estimated
to be fally responsible for a 2 percent reduction in losses from transit-related problems (which fell
from 5 percent of sales to 4 percent of now higher total sales). A fall of 10 percent in delivery times
was also reported to be due to changes brought about by trucking deregulation. Number of
employees have increased from 12 to 52.
62  See  Appendix  2.
423.  Eiectronie Components Company
A large Mexican producer of electronic components provides an interesting picture of a
company for which transport and logistics costs represent a much smaller percentage of total costs.
The company has downsized, with total employees falling from 500 1:0  350 between 1989 and
1997. It produces mainrly  passive components such as elecirolytic capacitors (50% of total current
sales), polyester, polypropylene and ceramic capacitors, and resistors. They build t:o  order from one
production plant, and sell only to wholesalers. The electronic components are shipped to the United
States (Michigan) along the Mexico City - Laredo corrido-, and to the airport for container
shipments to Europe and Asia. For U.S. shipments, they use the services of a smaller trucking
company who transports the product to the border. The prcduct is then transferred to a larger
company for within-U.S. transport. However, the U.S. trucking company is responsible for the
entire trip and quotes a single price. Total trucking costs account for roughly 2 percent of sales
(total transport costs, aLir  and trucking, are double, at approximately 4 percent of sales). In terms of
number of trucking service suppliers ideally suited to meelt  the company's  outbound logistics
needs, there was an increase from 5 to 10. The intensity of competition at the downstream level
increased in each individual product category, on average from 2 otheir  firms that could take away a
significant part of shipments to 4.
The cost of the Mexico City to Michigan route has increased by r oughly 15 percent in U.S.
dollar terms between 1]993  and 1997. However, the respondent was not able to provide any
estimates on the impor-tance  of reversing factors, such as increases in the cost of toll roads, higher
quality trucking services or more timely deliveries. It is clear that the quality of tmcking services
increased substantially, with transit-related losses declining by a spectacular 90 percent. Half of
this increase is reportedly due to trucking services, while the remainder is due to improved in-house
packaging. Delivery times on a given segment have also decreased by 40 percent.
The main impact of improvements in trucking services appears to have been in expanding
sales, with sales in new areas accounting for 50 percent of total sales, and 30 percent of this
increase accounted for by higher quality trucking services. In addition, there has been a 20 percent
increase in direct delivery customers, and in this case 70 percent of the increase is reported due to
higher quality trucking services. There also has been a significant increase in new products, with
the range of individual products in stock rising from 100 to 200; in terms of value of sales, new
products only account for a reported 7 percent of total 1997 sales. In this case, improved trucking
services accotut  for less than 20 percent of this increase, with most of the change attributed to the
increased price attractiveness of individual components as a result of Nafta-relateid tax changes and
to internal measures to raise quality. There have been a number of olher logistics-related internal
changes, such as introducing bar code tags to improve maeerial handling and introducing
computerised systems and telecoms improvements for faster and more reliable documentation
handling.
434.  Electronics Company
A large multinational electronics company provides a useful illustration of impact of road
freight reform where the cost of logistics is a very small fraction of total costs. The company
employs 1330 workers, a slight downsizing from 1500 in 1989. It mainly produces semiconductor-
rectifiers (accounting for 40 percent of sales) and 'surmeticos'  (for an additional 20 percent), in
addition to an array of other electronic components for export. Most of the output (80 percent) is
for in-house use in other worldwide production and assembly plants, with the remainder sold
directly to other companies.  Total trucking costs account for 1.8 percent of sales (total transport
costs, all modes, account for 4 percent of sales, of which air cargo is 50%, trucking 45% and ocean
shipping 5%). In terms of inbound logistics, roughly 60 percent comes from the United States via
truck, and the remainder from Europe and Asia via air and sea. In terms of outbound logistics,
which is more time-sensitive, roughly 30 percent is shipped back to the United States via truck
while the remainder is shipped by air to Europe and Asia. Of the five more intensively surveyed
companies, it is the two electronics component producers for which air cargo is the logistics service
perceived to have the greatest impact on costs. In terms of number of suppliers that are ideally
suited to meet the company's  inbound and outbound trucking requirements, the number has
increased from 1 to 2. In terms of intensity of competition as measured by direct competitors that
can take away a significant part of shipments, whereas the company was the only game in town in
1989, there are now 2 other close competitors.
The cost of a standard trucking route to end-points in the United States has increased in real
terms by roughly 5 percent. The respondent mentioned a number of reversing factors, including
newer trucks and tracking systems, but could not accurately estimate the impact of those
improvements. The main improvements appear related to quality of service, with losses related to
logistics problems having decreased by 75 percent (from 4% to 1% of sales). In addition, delivery
times on a given segment have decreased by 20 percent. However, it was again not clear to the
respondent how much of the increase was actually due to improved road freight services versus
other factors such as improved loading and unloading facilities and more sophisticated internal
software that facilitates planning and tracking.
In comparison with 1989, the firm has introduced new products, with the stock of individua.l
products increasing from 20 to 30. Sales of new products account for 15 percent of total 1997 sales.
The firm also covers a wider geographic area, with sales in new areas also accounting for roughly
15 percent of total 1997 sales. Finally, there has also been a significant increase in the number of
new direct-delivery customers. However, in all these areas, it was difficult for the respondent to
quantify with any degree of certainty the proportion of such new sales attributed to improvements
in road freight services. It is possible that part of the difficulty especially in this instance stems
from the inherent additional complexities of a multinational firm where key strategic sourcing and
logistics decisions are made in headquarters located in another country.
44FIGURE 1: Road freight haulage units
of the Mexican public federal system, 1980-1996
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198Tr7-0,1  31,20  141793W  1r989  124,87-  39,11~73  W14,1
1981  117,090  36,760  153,850  1990  178,130  44,853  222,983
1982  119,309  38,216  157,525  1991  209,060  67,865  276,925
1983  120,702  38,639  159,341  1992  224,913  78,233  303,146
198  4  120,702  38,639  159,341  1993  232,203  81,307  313,510
198.5  117,956  38,317  156,273  1994  198,273  93,827  292,100
1985  114,000  36,500  150,500  1995  204,117  96,638  300,755
1987  115,092  37,245  152,337  1996  212,909  102,409  315,318
1988  115,897  37,506  153,403
Source:  Based on SCT (1996), Estadistica Basica del Autotrans3orte Federal
45FIGURE  2: Road freight  enterprises
according  to number  of haulage  units, 1996
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Type of enterprise  No. of units  per  No. of  No.  of haulage uiits
enterprise  enterprises
Owner-operator  1 - 5  54,292  144,158
Srnml  6 -30  4,991  90,052
Medium  31-100  1  53,032
Large  101  +  187  28,076
Total  ,  315,318
Source: Elaboratedby CANACARbased on information fromINEGI, Censos Xl
y Xfl de Comunicaciones  y Transportes.
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47FIGURE 4: Age of equipment (motor units) 1990-97 and projections 1998 -2010
:  New fleet purchases
M  Renovations
--- Ave  rage  ap  e
n  y 
e
40,000  a a
20,0001.I
-4
I 000;  z,<v  X,,00  0  2 
a00U00o  0  ifV  fffff  f)0t:  ^  '  f  ;0  20t0i  012
yw - ~W  A  m  Nw  A  W  N  A  - YM  NM  A
1990  13,125  13  1  4,375  148  - 4  78  991  7
r99-  2l07-f.5  W-  -7T-  35,2014F  - 957-  5,-7
rT9,cW-  t -MTo5oo--  -7Y6--  -f  - 00  NT4000000  A;0000  0f.7-0  ;  00T1  - w  -3T0  - ;  -65,155- - T
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